Analysis of the coffee crisis in Zambia : financial distress and commodity price. by Hwenga, Elias.
ANALYSIS OF THE COFFEE CRISIS IN ZAMBIA.
Financial Distress and Commodity price
By
ELIAS HWENGA
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTERS IN BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
Graduate School Of Business, Faculty of Management
University OfNatal (Durban)





To Whom It May Concern:
Re: Confidentiality Clause
Due to the strategic importance of this research to the competitive position of the
companies cited, it would be appreciated if the contents remain confidential and not





This research has not been previously accepted for any degree and is not being
currently submitted in candidature for any degree.







I wish to thank Dr Dennis M. Laxton of the Graduate School of Business, Faculty of
Management, University ofNatal (Durban), the supervisor of this study, for his
supervision, review and guidance.
I also wish to thank African Plantations Company Ltd management, Zambia Coffee
Growers Association (ZCGA) and I & M Smith (Pty) Ltd, for allowing me to access
their information banks about the coffee industry.
IV
ABSTRACT
Coffee prices reached their lowest levels in 30 years in 2001 (and in 100
years in real terms). In almost all coffee producing countries, such prices are
unable to cover production costs and have led to serious social and economic
problems, including increased poverty, indebtedness and abandonment of
coffee farms. The heavy reliance on coffee renders APC vulnerable to
markets downturns and to the competitive pressures that exist in the industry.
The coffee crisis has actually been "brewing" for some time now, but has
recently percolated as the reality of far reaching structural changes in global
coffee production and marketing are being recognized.
While there are strategies that could be taken by the coffee industry to
improve on the current situation, these are unlikely to result in a quick
recovery of world prices or farms' profitability. Coffee farmers face at least two
distinct sets of problems associated with prices; the outright price level and
volatility. Historically, coffee prices have been among the most volatile of all
commodity prices. Cyclical price volatility, particUlarly within the crop season,
can be managed through price risk management instruments. However, the
secular price trend requires other longer-term elements, such as
diversification or improvements in quality and productivity.
The paper concludes that debt within the financial structures of industry
players is a result of the crisis and to solve the coffee crisis strategies
focussed on raising and stabilizing incomes of coffee producers is the ultimate
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The decline of coffee prices in the international market below 6 nts per Ib
have caused significant crisis in the Zambian Coffee Industry. The heavy
reliance on coffee renders APC vulnerable to markets downturns and to the-competitive pressures that exist in the industry. The coffee crisis has actually
been "brewing" for some time now, but has recently percolated as the reality
of far reaching structural changes in global coffee production and marketing
are being recognized.
The current coffee crisis presents a major challenge for improving overall
competitiveness of the countries' agricultural sectors in the global economy.
While there are strategies that could be taken by the coffee industry improve
on the current situation, these are unlikely to result in a quick recovery of
world prices or farms' profitability.
As a result, producers are more directly exposed to changes in international
coffee prices and there has been increased interest in identifying means to
increase and/or stabilize coffee-related incomes (Giovanucci, 2002).
"Diversification" is often been mentioned as a solution to the problems of low
and/or fluctuation coffee prices. However, when the term is loosely used, it
really means that producers need to "change" their existing activities. To
identify appropriate strategies, it is important to understand the different ways
that coffee producers can "diversify" or "change" their activities to achieve
higher and/or more stable incomes. There are different ways to increase and
stabilize incomes of farmers through diversification. It is possible to diversify
within coffee and diversify out of coffee. Raising and stabilizing incomes of
coffee producers is (are) the goal(s) and not increasing production statistics.
Value to the farmer can be increased through quality improvements,
improving financing and marketing arrangements and post-harvest practices.
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Another point of clarification is that costs and benefits of specialization and
diversification need to be considered at the farm/household level along with
community/regional and national levels. It is also quite clear that specializing
in a very profitable activity might make economic sense, while diversifying into
activities with low profitability (like maize, wheat etc) is not such a good
choice.
This research deals with analysing the coffee crisis in Zambia with particular
attention to African Plantations Company Ltd currently the biggest player in
the industry. The case study has been structured as follows:
Chapter 1 is giving all the background information about the coffee industry at
global, national and company levels. The objective and motivation behind the
study is also outlined in this first chapter. The problem statement has been
stated and limitations to the study have also been outlined in chapter one of
the study. Chapter 2 concentrate on literature review with special emphasis on
Financial Risks as defined in Capital structure. Chapter 3 goes into African
Plantations Company Ltd case study review giving details on operational,
financial and marketing strategies of the company. Chapter 4 evaluates the
case study and chapter 5 give various recommendations for APC and the
industry at large on how to fight the coffee crisis. Chapter 6 give some
spectacular conclusions.
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY
(a) Global Coffee Industry
Coffee is an important commodity in the world economy accounting for trade
approximately US$6billion in 2001. Like all agricultural commodities coffee
suffers from sharp variations in supply that, at times can cause wide and
violent fluctuations in price. The last twenty years demonstrate the recurrent
boom and bust cycles that characterise the coffee industry. Related to these
price fluctuations is the financial risk exposure of all coffee producers.
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Prices boomed in 1986 & 1987 in response to a perceived shortage brought
about by a drought in Brazil only to slump again in 1989 when International
quota system collapsed. Prices remained depressed for the next four years
until the next boom, induced by a general reduction in overall supply
exacerbated by the 1994 frosts in Brazil. Over supply in 1996 forced prices
sharply downwards but this was relatively short lived, prices boomed again in
1997 over fears of shortage of good quality arabicas following the poor
harvests because of El Nino phenomenon (UNCTADIWTO 2002)
(i) Nature of the Coffee Crisis
Over the past five years, the world coffee market has undergone important
changes in the supply side which reflects a steady increase in world
production and export levels. The current crisis in prices is not only part of a
cyclical phenomenon; but also, it is direct consequence of the new structure of
the market, which is exacerbating the problem for Zambian coffee producers.
The near term price projections are not encouraging. With demand growing
slowly and global production still at high levels and still expanding, most
analysts predict that coffee price recovery is likely to be slow, at least for the
near term. This threatens the longer-term sustainability of coffee production in
Zambia.
(ii) Structural changes in the World Coffee Market
In the 1990s, prices of coffee were mainly affected by shifts in Brazilian
production (caused mainly by frosts), subsequent adjustments by coffee
suppliers responding to price shifts and a slow but steady expansion of coffee
production in other countries, especially Vietnam. This period contrasted to a
generally downward trend in prices from highs in the mid 1970s. The loss of
about 13 million bags of Brazilian production in the mid 1990s pushed prices
to a high level.
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By the end of the 1990s, however, Brazilian post-frost replanting - freed from
government constraints on tree density and planting techniques, as well as
the opening of new production areas - has increased production and hence,
increased world supply. Brazilian cost of production have also declined
through the adoption of improved technologies and in particular mechanized
harvesting. In addition, new investments (plantings) in Vietnam and increasing
production from other traditional producing countries led to a substantial
coffee surplus.
During 2000 and 2001, worldwide supply caused coffee prices to drop to their
lowest levels in 30 years - or to a 100-year low, if adjusted for inflation.
Coffee prices have plummeted below the cost of production for many coffee
producers, causing financial and social hardships to farmers and labourers.
Total current production of green coffee is about 115 million bags (60 kilo net).
This exceeds consumption of about 105 million bags (80 million in importing
countries and 25 million in producing countries). Over-production has led to
the accumulation of inventories in producing and consuming countries, and
the drop in world prices.
Apart from over-supply, two other principal factors are underlying the current
crisis: structural changes in demand and changes in the nature of the supply
of quality coffee from Brazil and Vietnam.
(Hi) Changes in demand
Overall, world demand has recovered from the small drop that resulted from
the price increase in 1994/1995. As a result of economic liberalization and
growth in emerging countries, notably in Eastern Europe, part of Asia and
Latin America (especially Brazil), world demand has reached about 105
million bags. This world total masks a number of trends: -
• Aggregate demand in the major importing countries is growing slowly, if
at all. This suggests that increases in the high quality end of the market
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are being partly offset by losses elsewhere. Meanwhile, new non-
traditional markets are emerging and growing quickly, driven by the
availability of cheap coffees in soluble form
• Roasters have learned to increase the absorption of natural and robusta
coffees by such processes as steaming to remove the harshness of
taste.
• Roasters have learned to work with lower stocks. This has increased the
requirements of the logical capabilities on suppliers. This, in turn, has
favoured large trading companies, and has led to the consolidation of the
supply chain in fewer major traders.
• Roasters have become more flexible in their ability to make short-term
switches between coffee types.
• The consolidation of roasters in periods of oversupply has led to a
situation where prices at the retail level may not necessarily reflect the
reductions in green coffee prices in world markets.
• A small but viable segment of the market has emerged that focuses on
quality and product differentiation (specialty and gourmet coffees).
In addition to these trends, income effects are proving to be a significant factor
in coffee consumption. Consumption in northern Europe, particularly in
Germany, is stagnant, but is increasing somewhat in southern Europe and
growing in much of Eastern Europe. However, the increase in consumption in
Eastern Europe and in parts of Asia recovering from economic problems is
being driven by the high availability of cheap robustas which have allowed
roasters to make a product available at "affordable" prices. In Brazil, roasters
have taken an opposite approach, concentrating on labelling and quality in the
domestic market. This has allowed Brazil to increase domestic demand and
become the world's second largest consumer.
(iv) Changes in quality
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While supply has expanded, the quality of green coffee in some parts of the
world has also been improving. Higher quality beans from Brazil, derived from
better washing capabilities and quality controls, are intensifying the
competition against "Extra Hard," "Prime," and "Extra Prime" coffees from
Central America. Although Vietnam's coffee quality is still low, some quality
improvements in Vietnam - as evidenced by some recent favourable grading
results from the coffee future markets - are allowing roasters to use more of
these (Brazilian and Vietnamese) coffees. At the same time, there are
growing consumer markets for gourmet and other specialty coffees (gourmet,
fair-trade, organic, eco-friendly, etc) that command a significant price
premium.
(v) The impact of the coffee crisis on macroeconomics
During the 1999/2000 coffee in Central America accounted for about $1.7
billion, corresponding to about 11 % in total export revenues. Coffee was an
important source of export revenues in Guatemala, Nicaragua and Honduras,
but less so in Costa Rica and El Salvador. However, during 2000/2001 the
share of coffee in total exports has dropped to less than half of what it was in
1999/2000 mainly due to the price decline, ranging from about 3 - 4% for
Costa Rica to 14% for Nicaragua.
At the macroeconomic level, national governments and banks are also
affected by the loss of trade-generated earnings. Central America countries
have suffered a 44 percent decline in revenue from coffee exports in one year.
Export revenues from coffee dropped from US$1.7 billion to US$938 million
from crop year 1999/2000 to 2000/2001 and are estimated to fall further to
about US$700 million in 2001/2002. The decrease in exports hurts the
balance of payments and significantly affects overall economic activity,
particularly due to the broad impact of expenditures of coffee farmers and
labourers. The coffee sector debt and past due loans hamper the financial
sector, limiting banking activity and financing to other economic sectors.
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(vi) The impact of the crisis on production
Lower prices usually induce producers, particularly the less competitive ones
to reduce production. However, comparing coffee production and exports in
Central America since 1990, it can be observed that during the period 1990 to
2001 coffee production has increased by about 14% and exports by about
22%. There have been several reports that due to low prices farmers do not
tend their farms and apply less agro chemicals. Evidence indicates that
between 2000 and 2001, overall coffee yields declined in Central America,
with the largest declines registered in El Salvador (-25%), Nicaragua (-20%)
and Honduras (-17%). Anecdotal evidence suggests that much of the decline
is due to lower prices although it is possible that recent droughts and other
climate-related effects have also played a role.
(vii) The impact of the coffee crisis on employment
Coffee is a very important source of employment for the rural sector in Central
America. On average, over one quarter of the rural labour force is employed
in the coffee sector. It is worth noting that in Nicaragua, 42% of rural labour is
employed in coffee.
Low coffee prices are causing unemployment to reach critical levels in
producer countries. In the last two crop seasons, seasonal employment has
decreased by more than 20 percent, while permanent employment has
plummeted by more than 50 percent. More than half the permanent labour
force is now working at less than half capacity. Wages have also fallen as
farms have received lower coffee revenues and the supply of labour has.
swelled through unemployment. CEPAL (2002) estimated that the loss of
employment has resulted in a loss salary income of about $140 million for
Central America as a whole, of which coffee workers in Guatemala have lost
in salaries $62 million followed by Honduran coffee workers who lost $37
million.
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The situation is especially critical because, unlike other crops, the majority of
coffee producers are small holders living in remote rural areas who heavily
depend on their own harvest and extra cash from temporary picking work.
These growers depend on this cash income to pay for food and other
essential items such as school fees and health care and they have no cash
reserves on which to draw from in hard times. A crisis in the sector creates
social imbalances, a general downturn in the rural economy, accelerated
migration to urban areas and other countries and potential for instability.
Coffee is produced. by many small farmers who account for only a small
percentage of the total production. In contrast larger farmers, although a
small percentage of the total farmers, account for most production.
(viii) Impact of Coffee Crisis on Environment
• Environmental issues are not of high priority to many producers
struggling to cope with the coffee price crisis. Existing environmental
problems have, in some cases, worsened. Meanwhile, some new
environmentally related problems have intensified, such as destruction
of shade forest followed by decreasing biodiversity and destruction of
ecosystems and natural habitats.
• The crisis has led the reduction in the application of agro-chemical in
almost all the Central American countries (Guzman 2002). This may
have some beneficial short-term consequences for the environment
(water contamination and soil) but it may lead to spread of diseases
(e.g. leaf rust, CBO etc), and in the longer term the low profitability may
induce farmer to switch to other crops.
• The low price of coffee especially places pressures on producers to
grow other crops to supplement or substitute for coffee, in order to
survive. The new crops might not be adequate for the soils and slopes
in the coffee regions and introducing the inadequate crops could cause
serious erosion problems. Furthermore, abandoning the coffee
plantation and leaving cherries un-harvested can cause serious
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plagues and infestations of pests the following year, making it difficult
to reinitiate any aij(icultural production.
• The coffee crisis drives traditional coffee producers to cut down and
sell the shade forest as timber or firewood. Introducing new crops as a
substitute for coffee can motivate clearing of the coffee plants and
surrounding areas, using slash and burn techniques.
• Over the past years, an increasing number of wet mills have
implemented water and energy saving measures and promoted their
mills as environmentally friendly or certified. The coffee crisis might
prevent new mills from investments that implement such measures.
There is some evidence (Guzman 2002) that in Central America
countries with a possible exception Costa Rica, the current coffee crisis
has led to a reduction of sound environmental practices at the level of
wet milling.
(b) Zambia Coffee Industry
Coffee production in Zambia waited until the early 1980's and the first
recorded exports date from 1985. Modest initial success coupled with the
need to diversify Zambia's export base, resulted in the government seeking
foreign donor assistance to promote commercial coffee in the country.
The country is well situated to irrigated coffee with production with ample land
and water resources. The cost of production is comparatively low which
compensate for the fact that the country is landlocked. From a very small base
production of 330 tonnes in 1985 it has risen to over 5 700 tonnes in 2000
generating US$10 million. ( Figure 1.1)
The area under coffee for the whole country is 4 500 hectares of which 125
hectares are owned by small scale -farmers. The rest is owned by large -
scale farmers who are presently the mainstay of the industry. Zambia
produces washed mild arabicas comparable to the better qualities grown in
Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Most Zambian coffees are exported to
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Northern Europe with a small but increasing amount going to Japan and the
USA.
The industry is regulated by a statutory Coffee Board whose members
represent the government, small -scale farmers, large-scale, agricultural
research and extension services. The Zambia Coffee Growers Association,
ZCGA (the operative wing of the Coffee Board) provides coffee extension
services, quality control and is responsible for all export marketing as per the
Coffee Act of 1989. Membership is open only to registered coffee growers.
ZCGA sells coffee for its members through both spot tenders (auction
systems) and forward sales. Certain members, very few corporate coffee
growers, are authorized to market their crop independently, APC is allowed to
own sell 70% of its production.
The Zambian economy consumes very little of its coffee production and as a
result over 95% of it is exported. This leaves the industry players highly
exposed to various risks, ranging from foreign exchange, commodity price,
interest and financial distress risk caused by high debt levels. This research
seek to identify, measure and propose ways to manage this risk, with specific
focus on African Plantations Company, the current biggest coffee producer in
Zambia.
(c) Background of African Plantations Company Ltd
Eight years ago several blue chip investors and coffee and tea experts set out
to bring multiple estates together as one well managed group - maintaining
diversity while making each of the estates more financially viable. Through
acquisitions and joint development projects this group - African Plantations
Corporation (APC) now owns and operate a diversified portfolio of premier
coffee and tea estates in several sub- Saharan African countries. (http.//www:
apc.cc)
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APC has spent the past few years perfecting production methods and quality
assurance systems. The individual estates enjoy a high level of self -
sufficiency and protection against potential adverse local conditions. While the
risks brought about by weather have been managed by putting adequate
water security measures, there is still significant risk affecting the very
existence of APC in Zambia. The production and management side of the
company have been improved significantly but the company still face
significant financial risk brought about by the introduction of debt in 2000.
The company still is exposed as well to price changes of its main inputs,
(pesticides, herbicides, fungicides, fertilisers, fuel and spare parts) which are
mainly imported.
The coffee price and debt burden are the two main variables which are the
centre of this research.
We can not however ignore the contribution of business risk to the high level
of borrowing in the coffee industry in Zambia. The industry is highly exposed
to commodity price movements. For the past three years the price was highly
depressed and the producers had no option expect to go borrowing with the
hope the price will recover in the short term. The recovery did not come at the
expected time leaving the entire industry highly exposed to financial distress
risk.
In his chairman's report (Annual Report 2000) Mr Dekel Golan acknowledged
that the slide in coffee prices can not be treated as a force of nature, there is
high need than ever to put a hedging strategy in place if the company has to
survive. The same echoes were made by the new chairman Mr Heinrich von
Pezold in his opening remarks to the board on 26 June 2003, when he said
"not to hedge coffee price is the highest speculation the company is taking",
(board minutes no: 4/ 2003) this implies that the volatility of the coffee price is
the greatest threat the company faces and to ignore a hedging strategy is self
destructive.
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With the political problems in Zimbabwe gaining momentum in 2001, the
shareholders perceived some looming risk and they started dragging their feet
in putting more money into Africa, more so in southern region. Private
property was being expropriated in Zimbabwe and the shock waves extended
to Zambia where history could become realty and could repeat itself. During
the socialist era in Zambia private property was also nationalised and the risk
of this happening again was quite fresh in APC investors' mind. By this time
the Zambian operation was very young and developing and was still very
dependant on shareholders money. The investors closed their doors and here
we are, rational thinking tell us that what could they have done faced with all
negatives, they made a decision to loose no more and get nothing back. They
could not have increased their return to cover perceived risk because the
operation besides being young, was facing two evils, depressed coffee price
and the much dreaded debt in an unprofitable business.
One of the main objectives of APC was to increase shareholder value, the
value of the firm could not increase when future cash flows are at the mercy of
price risk and high interest rates brought about by high debt levels, to sustain
the development of the project.
In 2000, International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Swiss development
Finance Corporation AG (SDFC), introduced debt to APC balance sheet
mainly to refinance the shareholders and also to provide working capital for
Sub- region's biggest coffee project.
1.3 MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH
African Plantations Corporation Ltd shareholders by end of 2001 had made a
decision to close the business because the coffee price was unlikely to
recover, not in the immediate future. The board of directors were instructed to
put APC Zambia into receivership by February 2002. The shareholders had
not received any dividend from their investment of about US$12 million. The
company had also borrowed on the international market a total of US$
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5.5million excluding interest which had accumulated. The coffee price had
been blamed as the sole reason for this corporate failure. This is an example
of a corporate failure and my research is motivated by finding out what exactly
caused this problem for APC. Is it coffee price or there other factors. If it is
coffee price then the company did not adequately strategise for the down side
of the industry cycles. Could it be due to debt burden? IFC blocked all new
loans which were breaching the covenants in terms of debt-equity ratio and
the company could not raise any fresh loans.
1.4 VALUE OF THE PROJECT
This study is very important to the new APC management and shareholders.
This study is going to explore whether it is debt (financial risk) or commodity
price cycles (business risk) which caused the coffee crisis for APC and the
industry at large. After establishing the impact of the coffee crisis on APC the
study will propose ways of managing commodity price risk and how to reduce
financial risks. The recommendations will also cover other areas where APC
can improve in order to improve their cash flows.
1.5 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The decline of coffee prices in the international markets below USC50/Lb
have caused significant crisis in the coffee sector in Zambia. Over the past
five years the world coffee market has undergone important changes in the
supply side, which reflects a steady increase in world production and export
levels. The current crisis in prices is not only part of a cyclical phenomenon
but also it is a direct consequence of the new structure of the market.
The heavy reliance on coffee renders APC vulnerable to market downturns
and to the competitive pressures that exist in the industry.
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The purpose of this research is to discover the impact of commodity price on
African Plantations and measure the level of financial risk in the Zambian
Coffee Industry.
What caused financial distress for African Plantations Company in 2001, was
it due to high debt level, or coffee prices?
1.6 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
The main objectives of this study are:
• To evaluate the impact of the coffee crisis on the Zambian coffee
industry by using APC as a case study. APC has been selected since it
is the industry leader in Zambia and Southern Africa region, it may the
good characteristics of the industry.
• To determine the significance of debt and coffee price and their
ultimate contribution to coffee crisis for both APC and the Zambian
Coffee Industry. Whether the success or failure of APC is related to the
movements in both debt level and or commodity prices. Which of the
two variables have got more weight when defining the coffee crisis.
• To establish the relationship between coffee prices and the debt levels
and the performance of the company. The coffee crisis can not be




The sampling frame is the current four corporate coffee growers in Zambia,
African Plantations Company Ltd, Mpongwe Development Company Ltd,
Mubuyu Farms Ltd and Nanga Farms Ltd. Between these four 90% of Zambia
coffee production is shared. The sample size shall be limited to one company
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-African Plantations Company Ltd being the biggest producer of coffee in
Zambia will thus be a representative sample for all coffee growers in the
industry. It is noted that small scale coffee farmers may have different
situations to corporate farmers but its not covered in this research. African
Plantations Company produce more than 45% of the total national output and
therefore is more exposed to risks under consideration thus a much more
reliable representative of the industry.
(ii) Research Design
The design is a longitudinal, case study research design. The variables coffee
price and debt are measured over time. The impact of these variables is
analysed for one company APC. The emphasis is on acquiring detailed
insights for problem solving, evaluation and strategy formulation. The
research is essentially quantitative, involving collection of data from company
records and also the financial market through review of literature, interviews
and questionnaires. The collection of data will involve extraction of secondary
statistical data from published documents, like financial statements, New York
Board of Trade, International Coffee Organisation and other coffee
organisations.
(iii) Data Collection
My knowledge about the company have complemented by interviewing
industry experts, the CEG, Estate Managers of the company and Zambia
Coffee Growers Association (General manager) and the largest customer (I &
M Smith Pty Ltd). The records of the company have been used to extract most
of the data. A formal authority to use the company records for study purposes
was given by the Chairman of the Board. Board and management meetings
minutes were also used to extract information.
Historical information on interest and exchange rates was obtained from
company records about the same. The original source was Standard
Chartered bank the company's bankers.
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A list of coffee prices on the world market since 1996 was extracted from ICO
publications and its impact on the performance of the company was analysed.
Information about Zambia Industry statistics was obtained from Zambia Coffee
Growers Association the controlling board in the country.
To gain a deeper understanding of the financial risks associated with the
coffee industry, additional data shall be gathered through unstructured
interviews from industry expects.
The New York Board of Trade web-site was used to provide additional
industry statistics.
(iv) Data Analysis
The effects of debt -level and coffee price changes on the company are going
to be measured and compared to the company's financial performance.
The financial statements for the company and other information are going to
be used to determine the debt -equity ratios and the ultimate financial distress
risk can be established. Line graphs, Histograms and other charts shall be
used to express the findings
1.8 LIMITATIONS
• Since its inception APC have never produced a profit and as a result no
dividend was ever paid to the shareholder. In such circumstances, the
cost of equity is not available and for the purposes of the research 13% ./
had been used, being the recent interest rate demanded by new
shareholders on their interest bearing loans. This has been assumed to
be applicable since 1997 for the purposes of this model.
• Due to the difficulties in getting the market value of APC equity the
book values had been used in all cases. APC is not listed on any stock
exchange and the only agricultural company listed on Lusaka Stock
Exchange, Zambia Sugar PLC produces a different commodity
altogether.
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• As debt was introduced in APC financial Policy in 2000, according to
MM theory the shareholders were supposed to increase their required
return to compensate for the risk premium, but this could not be applied
to APC since the shareholders did not get any return.
• The tax shelter brought about by debt reduces the cost of capital,
however APe have not been profitable hence the effects of tax are
limited in this case. I can not test MM's theory due to this
limitation.
• Other contributions by Stewart Myers were not tested due to lack
of market- to - book value ratios.
CHAPTER 2 THEORIES ON FINANCIAL RISK
2. 1 Modigliani and Miller
Financial Risk is the additional variability in returns to shareholders that arises
because the financial structure contains debt. (Arnold 2002). Financing a
business through borrowing is cheaper than using equity, due to the fact that
lenders require lower rate of return than ordinary shareholders. Debt finance
has prior claims on income and in liquidation. In addition security is provided
and covenants imposed give some form of certainty to the lender as result
debt finance become cheaper. The cost of raising and servicing debt is
generally less than for ordinary shares.
The introduction of interest -bearing debt gears up the returns to
shareholders. If profits are high the geared firm's shareholder will experience
a more than proportional boost in their returns compared to the un-geared
firm's shareholders. This is because interest on debt is tax deductible. If
profits turn out to be low the geared firm's shareholders will find their returns
declining to an exaggerated extent. APC has not been profitable since it was
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incorporated, so interest charges exaggerated the losses to the shareholders
and also exchange loss on loans brought about by huge devaluations of the
kwacha also increased the losses. By introducing debt the potential returns to
shareholders have been geared up.
The increasing proportion of debt raises the firm's fixed financial costs. At high
gearing levels there is an increased probability of the firm not only failing to
make a return to the shareholders, but also failing to meet the interest cost
obligation and thus raising the likelihood of insolvency.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) argues that the value of the firm remain constant
regardless of the level of debt. They believed that when debt increases the
equity holders will demand a risk premium for the financial risk brought about
by debt. This increase in cost of equity exactly offset the benefit of cheaper
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) brought about by cheaper debt. If
WACC is constant then the only factor which influences the value of the firm is
its cash flow generated from operations. They argued that the total market
value of any company is independent of its capital structure, thus the total
market value of the firm is the net present value of the income streams. By
this they implied that business risk is the only one which affects the value of
the firm.
Modigliani and Miller in their world of no taxes argued that as shareholders
see the risk of their investment increase because the firm is taking more debt
levels they demand a higher level of return. The geared firm pays a risk
premium for financial risk.
In their 1963 model Modigliani and Miller introduced tax and the results were
completely different. Tax shelter reduces the effective cost of debt capital.
Now value rises as debt is replaced equity in the capital structure. The cost of
equity rises with the introduction of debt but the extent of the rise is insufficient
to exactly offset the cheaper debt.
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Arnold 2002 noticed that in the real world companies do not generally raise
their debt-ta-equity ratios to very high levels. There must be some very
important influences on capital structure not yet taken into account. Stewart
Myers argued that our financial theories don't seem to explain the actual
financing behaviour and it is presumptuous to advise firms on optimal
structure when we are so far away from explaining the actual decisions.
Besides the perceived benefits from debt many firms today seem to avoid
very high gearing levels. The reason is high gearing brings financial distress
risk. This is brought about by the fact that interest payments are regardless of
the business cash flows.
The risk of cash flows from any asset reflects both business risk (profit
fluctuations due to business conditions) and financial risk (increased profit
fluctuations due to leverage). Servicing of Debt is a fixed cost, greater fixed
cost makes profits more risky, but leverage increases equity risk.
There is no precise formula which can be employed to establish the best debt-
equity ratio for firms in all circumstances. This depends on so many specific
and often difficult to measure factors. (Arnold 2002.829). These factors
include the tax position of the firm, the likelihood of financial distress, the type
of business the firm is in, the saleability of its assets, the level of business risk
and the psychology of the market.
Equity is soft, debt is hard, Equity is forgiving, Debt is insistent (Bennett
Stewart 1990,580) implies that operating and strategic problems and
inefficiencies are less likely to be attended to and corrected with capital base
which is primarily equity. However the managers of a highly geared company
are more likely to be attuned to the threat of falling efficiency and profitability.
The present value, which represents the contribution of debt financing to the
market value of the firm, could be estimated simply by multiplying the
company's marginal tax rate say 34% times the principal amount of
outstanding debt (assuming the firm expects to maintain its current debt level).
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The problem with this analysis, however, is that it overstates the tax
advantage of debt by considering only the corporate profits tax. Many
investors who receive interest income must pay taxes on that income. But
those same investors who receive equity income in form of capital gains are
taxed at a lower rate and can defer any tax by choosing not to realize those
gains. Thus, although higher leverage lowers the firm's corporate taxes, it
increases the taxes paid by investors. And because investors care about their
after-tax returns, they require compensation for these increased taxes in the
form of higher yields on corporate debt - higher than the yields on, say,
comparably risky tax-exempt municipal bonds.
The higher yields on corporate debt that reflect investors' taxes effectively
reduce the tax advantage of debt over equity. In this sense, the company's
shareholders ultimately bear all of the tax consequences of its operations,
whether the company pays those taxes directly in the form of corporate
income tax or indirectly in the form of higher required rates of return on the
securities its sells. For this reason alone, the tax advantage of corporate debt
is almost certainly not 34 cents for every dollar of debt. Nor is it likely to be
zero, however, and so a consistently profitable company that volunteers to
pay more taxes by having substantial unused debt capacity is likely to be
leaving considerable value on the table.
2.2 Contracting cost theory
Conventional capital structure analysis holds that financial managers set
leverage targets by balancing the tax benefits of higher leverage against the
greater probability, and thus higher expected costs, of financial distress. In
this view, the optimal capital structure is the one in which the next dollar of
debt is expected to provide an additional tax subsidy that just offsets the
resulting increase in expected costs of financial distress.
To test the contracting cost theory, Stewart Myers et al attempted to
determine the extent to which corporate leverage choices can be explained by
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differences in companies' investment opportunities. As suggested earlier, the
contracting cost hypothesis predicts that the greater these investment
opportunities (relative to the size of the company), the greater the potential
underinvestment problem associated with debt financing and, hence, the
lower the company's target leverage ratio. Conversely, the more limited a
company's growth opportunities, the greater the potential overinvestment
problem and, hence, the higher should be the company's leverage.
To test this prediction, they needed a measure of investment opportunities.
Because stock prices reflect intangible assets such as growth opportunities
but corporate balance sheets do not, they reasoned that the larger a
company's "growth options" relative to its "assets in place," the higher on
average will be its market value in relation to its book value. They accordingly
used a company's market-to-book ratio as a proxy for its investment
opportunity set.
The results of their regressions provide strong support for the contracting cost
hypothesis. Companies with high market-to-book ratios had significantly lower
leverage ratios than companies with low market-to-book ratios. Moreover,
such a negative relation between corporate leverage and market-to-book
ratios appears to hold outside the U. S. as well.
In a 1995 study, Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales examined capital
structure using data from Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Canada,
as well as the U. S. They found that, in each of these seven countries,
leverage is lower for firms with higher market-to-book ratios and higher for
firms with higher ratios of fixed assets to total assets.
2.3 Cost of Financial Distress
Although the direct expenses associated with the administration of the
bankruptcy process appear to be quite small relative to the market values of
companies, the indirect costs can be substantial. In thinking about optimal
capital structure, the most important indirect costs are likely to be reductions
21
in firm value that result from cutbacks in promising investment that tend to be
made when companies get into financial difficulty.
When a company files for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy judge effectively
assumes control of corporate investment policy - and it's not hard to imagine
circumstances in which judges do not maximize firm value. But even in
conditions less extreme than bankruptcy, highly leveraged companies are
more likely than their low-debt counterparts to pass up valuable investment
opportunities, especially when faced with the prospect of default. In such
cases, corporate managers are likely not only to postpone major capital
projects, but to make cutbacks in R & D, maintenance, advertising, or training
that end up reducing future profits.
This tendency of companies to under-invest when facing financial difficulty is
accentuated by conflicts that can arise among the firm's different
c1aimholders. To illustrate this conflict, consider what might happen to a high-
growth company that had trouble servicing its debt. Since the value of such a
firm will depend heavily on its ability to carry out its long-term investment plan,
what the company needs is an infusion of equity. But there is a problem. As
Stewart Myers pointed out in his classic 1977 paper entitled "Determinants of
Corporate Borrowing" the investors who would be asked to provide the new
equity in such cases recognize that much of the value created (or preserved)
by their investment would go to restoring the creditors' position. In this
situation, the cost of the new equity could be so high that managers acting on
their shareholders' behalf might rationally forgo both the capital and the
investment opportunities.
Myers referred to this as "the underinvestment problem." And, as he went on
to argue, companies whose value consists primarily of intangible investment
opportunities - or "growth options" as he called them - will choose low-debt
capital structures because such firms are likely to suffer the greatest loss in
value from this underinvestment problem. By contrast, mature companies
with few profitable investment opportunities where most of their value reflects
the cash flows from tangible "assets in place" incur lower expected costs
22
associated with financial distress. Such mature companies, all else equal
should have significantly higher leverage ratios than high-growth firms.
2.4 The benefits of debt in controlling overinvestment
If too much debt financing can create under-investment problem for growth
companies, too little debt can lead to an over-investment problem in the case
of mature companies. As Michael Jensen has argued, large, mature public
companies generate substantial "free cash flow" - that is, operating cash flow
that cannot be profitably reinvested inside the firm. The natural inclination of
corporate managers is to use such free cash flow to sustain growth at the
expense of profitability, either by over-investing in their core businesses or
perhaps worse, by diversifying through acquisition into unfamiliar ones.
Because both of these strategies tend to reduce value, companies that aim to
maximize firm value must distribute their free cash flow to investors. Raising
the dividend is one way of promising to distribute excess capital. But major
substitutions of debt for equity (for example, in the form of leveraged stock
repurchases) offer a more reliable solution because contractually obligated
payments of interest and principal are more effective than discretionary
dividend payments in squeezing out excess capital. Thus, in industries
generating substantial cash flow can add value simply by forcing managers to
be more critical in evaluating capital spending plans.
(a) Leverage Ratios:
Much of the previous evidence on capital structure supports the conclusion
that there is an optimal capital structure and that firms make financing
decisions and adjust their capital structures to move closer to this
optimum. For example, a 1967 study by Eli Schwartz and Richard
Aronson showed clear differences in the average debt to (book) asset
ratios of companies in different industries, as well as a tendency for
companies in the same industry to cluster around these averages.
Moreover, such industry debt ratios seem to align with R & 0 spending and
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other proxies for corporate growth opportunities that the theory suggests
are likely to be important in determining an optimal capital structure.
In a 1985 study, Michael Long and Ileen Malitz showed that the five most
highly leveraged industries - cement, blast furnaces and steel, paper and
allied products, textiles, and petroleum refining - were all mature and
asset-intensive. At the other extreme, the five industries with the lowest
debt ratios - cosmetics, drugs, photographic equipment, aircraft and radio
and TV receiving - were all growth industries with high advertising and R &
D.
Other studies have used "cross-sectional" regression techniques to test
whether the theoretical determinants of an optimal capital structure actually
affect financing decisions. For example, in their 1984 study, Michael Bradley,
Greg Jarrell and Han Kim found that the debt to (book) asset ratio was
negatively related to both the volatility of annual operating earnings and to
advertising and R & 0 expenses. Both of these findings are consistent with
high costs of financial distress for growth companies, which tend to have more
volatile earnings as well as higher spending on R & D.
Several studies have also reported finding that the debt ratios of individual
companies seem to revert toward optimal targets. For example, a 1982 study
by Paul Marsh estimated a company's target years. He then found that the
probability that a firm issues equity is significantly higher if the firm is above its
target debt ratio, and significantly lower if below the target.
Ross Watts (1995) attempted to add to this body of empirical work on capital
structure by examining a much larger sample of companies that he tracked for
over three decades. For some 6,700 companies covered by COMPUSTAT,
they calculated "market" leverage ratios (measured as the book value of total
debt divided by the book value of debt and preferred stock plus the market
value of equity) over the period 1963 - 1993. Not surprisingly, he found
considerable differences in leverage ratios, both across companies in any
given year and in some cases, for the same firm over time. Although the
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average leverage ratio for the 6700 companies over the 30-year period was
25%, one fourth of the cases had market leverage ratios that were higher than
37.5% and another one fourth had leverage ratio less than 10.3%.
(b) Debt Maturity and Priority
Most academic discussions of capital structure focus just on the leverage
ratio. In so doing, they effectively assume that all debt financing is the same.
In practice, of course, debt differs in several important respects, including
maturity, covenant restrictions, security, convertibility and call provisions and
whether the debt is privately placed or held by widely dispersed public
investors. Each of these features is potentially important in determining the
extent to which debt financing can cause, or exacerbate, a potential
underinvestment problem. For example, debt-financed companies with more
investment opportunities would prefer to have debt with shorter maturities (or
at least with call provisions, to ensure greater financing flexibility), more
convertibility provisions (which reduce the required coupon payments), less
restrictive covenants and a smaller group of private investors rather than
public bondholders (which makes it easier to reorganize in the event of
trouble). By recognizing this array of financing choices, we can broaden the
scope of our examination and raise the potential power of our analysis, while
at the same time increasing the relevance of the analysis for managers who
must choose the design of their debt securities.
Stewart Myers in his 1977 article described that one way for companies with
lots of growth options to control the underinvestment problem is to issue debt
with shorter maturities. The argument is basically this: a firm whose value
consists mainly of growth opportunities could severely reduce its future
financing and strategic flexibility - and in the process destroy much of its
value - by issuing long-term debt. Not only would the interest rate have to be
high to compensate lenders for their greater risk, but the burden of servicing
the debt could cause the company to defer strategic investments if their
operating cash flow turns down. By contrast, shorter-term debt, besides
25
carrying lower interest rates in such cases, would also be less of a threat to
future strategic investment because as the firm's current investment beginning
to payoff, it will be able over time to raise capital on more favourable terms.
When they tested this prediction (again using market-to-book as a measure of
growth options), they found that growth companies tended to have
significantly less debt with a maturity greater than three years than companies
with limited investment opportunities. More specifically, their regressions
suggest that moving from companies at the 10th to the 90th percentile of
market-to-book ratios (that is from 0.77 to 2.59) reduces the ratio of long-term
debt to total debt by 18 percentage points (a significant reduction, given a
sample average ratio of 46%).
Moreover, it was also found that in the same study that the debt issued by
growth firms is significantly more concentrated among high-priority classes.
Consistent with the results indicating that firms with more growth options tend
to have lower leverage ratios, it was found that changing the market-to-book
ratio from the 10th to the 90th percentile is associated with reductions in
leasing of 89%, in secured debt of 71 %, in ordinary debt of 78% and In
subordinated debt of almost 250%. The explanation for this is as follows:
When firms get into financial difficulty, complicated capital structures with
claims of different priorities can generate serious conflicts among creditors,
thus exacerbating the underinvestment problem described earlier. And
because such conflicts and the resulting underinvestment have the greatest
potential to destroy value in growth firms, those growth firms that do issue
fixed claims are likely to choose mainly high-priority fixed claims.
2.5 Information cost Theory
Corporate executives often have better information about the value of their
companies than outside investors. Recognition of this information disparity
between managers and investors has led to two distinct but related theories of
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financing decisions - one known as "signalling," the other as the "pecking
order."
(a) Signalling theory
With better information about the value of companies than outside investors,
managers of undervalued firms would like to raise their share prices by
communicating this information to the market. Unfortunately, this task is not
as easy as it sounds; simply announcing that the companies are undervalued
generally isn't enough. The challenge for managers is to find a credible
signalling mechanism.
Economic theory suggests that information disclosed by an obviously biased
source (like management, in this case) will be credible only if the costs of
communicating falsely are large enough to constrain managers to reveal the
truth. Increasing leverage has been suggested as one potentially effective
signalling device. Debt contracts oblige the firm to make a fixed set of cash
payments over the life of the loan; if these payments are missed, there are
potentially serious consequences, including bankruptcy. Equity is more
forgiving. Debt is insistent. Although stockholders also typically expect cash
payouts, managers have more discretion over these payments and can cut or
omit them in times of financial distress.
For this reason, adding more debt to the firm's capital structure can serve as a
credible signal of higher future cash flows. By committing the firm to make
future interest payments to bondholders, managers communicate their
confidence that the firm will have sufficient cash flows to meet these
obligations.
Debt and equity also differ with respect to their sensitivity to changes in firm
value. Since the promised payments to lenders are fixed and shareholders
are entitled to the residual (or what's left over after the fixed payments), share
prices are much more sensitive than debt prices to any proprietary information
about future prospects. If management is in possession of good news that
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has yet to be reflected in market prices, the release of such news will cause a
larger increase in share prices than in bond prices, and hence current stock
prices (prior to release of the new information) will appear more undervalued
to managers than current bond prices. For this reason, signalling theory
suggests that managers of companies that believe their assets are
undervalued will generally choose to issue debt - and to use equity only as a
last resort.
Consistent with this theory, economists have documented that the market
responds in systematically negative fashion to announcements of equity
offerings, marking down the share prices of issuing firms by 3% on average.
By contrast, average market reaction to new debt offerings is not significantly
different from zero. The important thing to recognize is that most companies
issuing new equity - those that are undervalued as well as those that are
overvalued - can expect a drop in stock prices when they announce the
offering. For those firms that are fairly valued or undervalued prior to the
announcement of the offering, this expected drop in value represents an
economic dilution of the existing paper, we refer to this dilution as part of the
"information costs" of raising outside capital.
(b) The Pecking Order theory
Signalling theory, then, says that financing decisions are based, at least in
part, on management's perception of the "fairness" of the market's current
valuation of the stock. Stated as simply as possible, the theory suggests that,
in order to minimize the information costs of issuing securities, a company is
more likely to issue debt than equity if the firm appears undervalued, and to
issue stock rather than debt if the firm seems to be overvalued.
The pecking order theory takes this argument one step farther, suggesting
that the information costs associated with issuing securities are so large that
they dominate all other considerations. According to this theory, companies
maximize value by systematically choosing to finance new investments with
the "cheapest available" source of funds. Specifically, they prefer internally
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generated funds (retained earnings) to external funding and, if outside funds
are necessary, they prefer debt to equity because of the lower information
costs associated with debt issues. Companies issue equity only as a last
resort, when their debt capacity has been exhausted.
The pecking order theory would thus suggest that companies with few
investment opportunities and substantial free cash flow will have low debt
ratios - and that high-growth firms with lower operating cash flows will have
high ratios. In this sense, the theory not only suggests that interest tax shields
and the costs of financial distress are at most a second-order concern; the
logic of the pecking order actually leads to a set of predictions that are
precisely the opposite of those offered by the tax and contracting cost
arguments presented above.
(i) Leverage:
Signalling theory says that companies are more likely to issue debt than
equity when they are undervalued because of the large information costs (in
form of dilution) associated with an equity offering. The pecking order model
goes even farther, suggesting that the information costs associated with
riskier securities are so large that most companies will not issue equity until
they have completely exhausted their debt capacity. Neither the signalling nor
the pecking order theory offers any clear prediction about what optimal capital
structure would be for a given firm. The signalling theory seems to suggest
that a firm's actual capital structure will be influenced by whether the company
is perceived by management to be undervalued. The pecking order model is
more extreme; it implies that a company will not have a target capital
structure, and that its leverage ratio will be determined by gap between its
operating cash flow and its investment requirements over time. Thus, the
pecking order predicts that company with consistently high profits or modest
financing requirements are likely to have low debt ratios - mainly because
they don't need outside capital. Less profitable companies, and those with
large financing requirements will end up with high leverage ratios because of
managers' reluctance to issue equity.
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A number of studies have provided support for the pecking order theory in the
form of evidence of a strong negative relation between past profitability and
leverage. That is, the lower are a company's profits and operating cash flows
in a given year, the higher is its leverage ratio (measured either in terms of
book or market values.) Moreover, in an article published in 1998, Steward
Myers and Lakshmi Shyam-Sunder added to this series of studies by showing
that this relation explains more of the time-series variance of debt than a
simple target-adjustment model of capital structure that is consistent with the
contracting cost hypothesis.
Such findings have generally have been interpreted as confirmation that
managers do not set target leverage ratios - or at least do not work very hard
to achieve them. But this is not the only interpretation that fits these data.
Even if companies have target leverage ratios, there will be an optimal
deviation from those targets - one that will depend on the transactions costs
associated with adjusting back to the target relative to the costs of deviating
from the target. To the extent there are fixed costs and scale economies in
issuing securities, companies with capital structure targets - particularly
smaller firms - will make infrequent adjustments and often will deliberately
overshoot their targets.
(ii) Maturity and Priority
Signalling theory implies that undervalued firms will have more short-term
debt and more senior debt than overvalued firms because such
instruments are less sensitive to the market's assessment of firm value
and thus will be less undervalued when issued.
tf\tMO
In sum, managers' use of financing choices to signal their superior information
to the market are not robust and the economic effect of any such signalling on
corporate decision-making seems minimal.
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According to the pecking order theory, the firm should issue as much of the
security with the lowest information costs as it can. Only after this capacity is
exhausted should it move on to issue a security with higher information costs.
Thus, for example, firms should issue as much secured debt or capitalized
leases as possible before issuing any unsecured debt, and they should
exhaust their capacity for issuing short-term debt before issuing any long-term
debt.
To explain these more detailed aspects of capital structure, proponents of the
pecking order theory must go outside their theory and argue that other costs
and benefits determine these choices. But once you allow for these other
costs and benefits to have a material impact on corporate financing choices,
you are back in the more traditional domain of optimal capital structure
theories.
African Plantations Company in their balance sheet show that they do not
have any retained earnings in fact a huge loss is reflected. And according to
the perking order theory the next source of less resistance is debt and that's
why management decided to go for debt. Assuming the levels of growth APC
had planned the perking order theory is again confirmed. APC had planned to
plant 2000 ha and to produce 5 000 tonnes per annum had it not been for
price this qualified APC as a high growth company from a production of as low
as 130 tonnes in 1996 to 5 000 tonnes by 2004 is serious growth hence
management argument to have high debt ratios.
2.6 The evidence on taxes
Theoretical models of optimal capital structure predict that firms with more
taxable income and fewer non-debt tax shields should have higher leverage
ratios. But the evidence on the relation between leverage ratios and tax-
related variables is mixed at best. For example, studies that examine the
effect of non-debt tax shields on companies' leverage ratios find that this
effect is either insignificant, or that it enters with the wrong sign. That is, in
contrast to the prediction of the tax hypothesis, these studies suggest that
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depreciation; net operating loss carry-forwards and investment tax credits
have, if anything, more not less debt in their capital structures.
But before we conclude that taxes are unimportant in the capital structure
decision, it is critical to recognize that the findings of these studies are hard to
interpret because tax variables are crude proxies for a company's effective
marginal tax rate. In fact, these proxies are often correlated with other
variables that influence the capital structure choice. For example, companies
with investment tax credits, high levels of depreciation and other non-debt tax
shields also tend to have mainly tangible fixed assets. And, since fixed assets
provide good collateral, the non-debt tax shields may in fact be a proxy not for
limited tax benefits, but rather for low contracting costs associated with debt
financing. The evidence from the studies just cited is generally consistent with
this interpretation.
Similarly, firms with net operating loss carry forwards are often in financial
distress; and since equity values typically decline in such circumstances,
financial distress itself causes leverage ratios to increase. Thus, again, it is
not clear whether net operating losses proxy for low tax benefits of debt or for
financial distress.
More recently, several authors have succeeded in detecting tax effects in
financing decisions by focusing on incremental financing choices (that is,
changes in the amount of debt and equity) rather than on the levels of debt
and equity. For example, a 1990 study by Jeffrey Mackie-Mason examined
registered security offerings by public US corporate and found that firms were
more likely to issue debt if they had a high marginal tax rate and to issue
equity if they had a low tax rate. In another attempt to avoid the difficulties
with crude proxy variables, a 1996 study by John Graham used a
sophisticated simulation method to provide a more accurate measure of
companies' marginal tax rates. Using such tax rates, Graham also found a
positive association between changes in debt ratios and the firm's marginal
tax.
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On balance, then, the evidence appears to suggest that taxes play at least a
modest role in corporate financing and capital structure decisions.
CHAPTER 3 CASE STUDY REVIEW
From its inception African Plantations Company had the following objectives:
• To become the largest low cost producer of high quality premium
coffee. (Operational Approach)
• Maximise shareholders value and provide high capital appreciation for
its investors. (Financial Structure Approach)
• Approach the market directly by selling to roasters rather through
Agents and Brokers (Marketing Approach)
3.0 SWOT ANALVSIS
3.0.1 Strengths
APC Zambia has strength in its ability to produce a consistent quality product
which meets all normal quality standards world wide. The company has well
experienced management in place to carry out its ambitions and policies as
desired. There is plentiful supply of land and water to allow further expansion
to the expected 2000 hectares. The current success of the company in terms
of production and quality will attract further financial resources.
Weaknesses
APC Zambia has so far failed to reach its hectarage target of 2 000 and
production tonnages predicted at its inception and also the revised targets
given to the major lenders and shareholders in 2000 when the first
restructuring was done to incorporate debt into the financial structure of the
company.
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The company also have the greatest disadvantage with the coffee berry
disease (CBD) which no one else in the country experience at the same
magnitude. This is further worsened by poor variety selection when the first
plantings were done. The varieties in place are very susceptible to the CBD
disease and this push up the cost of production while at the same time
reduces yield.
Very little research and development have been done into areas of varieties
and plant populations both by APC and the industry at large. Everything APC
done was on trial basis but consuming huge sums of money.
APC is further disadvantaged by its location which is far away from both the
sources of input supply and also the major output outlets. These attract
additional cost compared to other producers in the country. This is further
worsened by poor telecommunications and other infrastructure in an area with
virtually no economic activity other than itself. This creates difficult logistics in
all spheres of operation. No spares are immediately available for any
machine in the company. Lead times are long and transport expensive.
3.0.2 Opportunities
APC Zambia has tremendous potential some of which are already bearing
fruit now. As sub Saharan Africa's largest single coffee expansion it is in an
excellent position to trade on this success and further expand its operations
though not necessarily in coffee.
Opportunities exist mainly in the area of further expansion. Land is cheap and
plentiful and with some of Africa's best irrigation potential the ability to
produce high value commodity crops.
Structural changes in the supply chain of coffee creates more opportunities for
APC if they can attain and maintain certain quality required. To achieve this
APC need to change it's financing and marketing arrangement to be more
attuned to market changes.
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3.0.3 Threats
A minor (by the standards of the continent) political threat is always evident. It
is however, controllable at the moment.
Brazil must be recognized as a threat. It will have to be APC's aim to be
ahead of Brazil in as many spheres of the coffee production business as
possible. Our ability to produce superior quality will be there for some time.
Our ability to produce yield and quality will be the only two criteria which will
allow APC to stay in business.
However, it must be recognized that we are facing the economic tiger of the
next few decades with an economy based on tropical agriculture. Brazil's
coffee growing is changing. The production is moving away from any frost
area. We have witnessed frost in Brazil in 2000 which a decade ago would
send world prices spiralling. A very brief jump in price was experience
instead. Large scale development of coffee growing in conditions not too
dissimilar to that of Northern Zambia is being done in the Bahia region of
Brazil. A slow move is being made to wet processing using machinery
identical to that we are currently installing. We will be able to combine
production of quality with mechanical harvesting so too will Brazil.
Our cost of production will have to kept at the same level or lower than that of
Brazil to enable the company to stay in business. Yield is the main driver in
reducing that cost.
3.1 OPERATIONAL POLICY
To achieve its low cost - high quality objective APC planned to plant 2 000
hectares of coffee in Zambia and to produce 5 000 tonnes. Low cost is
achieved through increased output and high quality is dependent on various
factors as will be outlined in the following sections. It acquired four estates in
Northern Zambia, and started expanding from 291 hectares in 1996 to 1290
hectares in 2001 and producing 3 000 tonnes in 2003. The following
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considerations were given priority in order to meet the high objectives of the
company.
If APC were to grow coffee that yielded when mature an average of 4 500kgs
per hectare, fifty percent above our current predictions and in line with the
better Brazilian producers, projected cost per kilo would drop by USC29. If
this same coffee were resistant to CBO, and leaf rust and seventy five percent
of the crop machine harvested costs would drop a further US$0.17 a kilo to
US$0.81. A grade out of eighty percent of the top two grades (AA1AB), would
improve average cup quality add an additional US$0.05 a kilo without any
additional marketing effort. (COO report to the board Aug 2000) It seemed
reasonable to expect that an R & 0 effort with the above goals could improve
the margin on coffee by US$0.50 a kilo. APC expects to produce in excess of
5 million kilos of coffee by 2004.
3.1.1 Mechanization
This is the only viable way of properly maintaining and managing the current 1
290 ha and projected 2000 ha. Further acquisitions of sprayers , tractors and
cultivators was put in place and a replacement policy adopted. A basic spray
system per 500 ha estate consist of 3 by 1 500 litre sprayers for foliar
application of fertilizer and fungicide, 3 by 1 500 litre sprayer for herbicide and
ground application. Centre pivots were mounted with injector equipmef!t to
allow fertigation.
Partial and on an experimental area full mechanization of the harvesting was
carried out. This is the only option available to properly harvest the
considerable crop in 2003 and beyond. Projected daily cherry intakes could
exceed 500 tonnes per day on the three Estates. Mechanical harvesting is the
only way of taking these volumes of cherry off the trees. APC acquired
Africa's first coffee harvester and the initial experiments showed promising
results. The tree sustained minimal damage and picked an even standard.
Further trial however proved different results. It was anticipated that it will be
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possible to machine harvest at least seventy five percent of the area In
Zambia.
Zambia 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Crop Mandays Crop Mandays Crop Mandays Crop Mandays Crop Mandays
Without 5
harvester 1802 195217 3330 360750 4792 519133 620 608833 5578 604283
With
harvester 1802 156173 3330 216450 4792 207653 5620 152208 5578 151071
% area
machine 20 40 60 75 75
The figures for Zambia above roughly translate into the difference between
employing 6 800 people a day on harvesting without the machine and 1700 a
day with the machine.
Harvesters have been successfully used in Brazil for over twenty years, this
however is on "natural coffees" where red, green and black (mbuni) cherry are
all harvested together. Only in Hawaii are machines used to harvest red
cherry. APe was to combine relatively cheap labour for picking together with
the harvesters to optimize coffee quality.
The machine harvesting failed due to:
• Synchronised flowering in each block to achieve uniform ripening and
spread flowering out between blocks, lengthening the harvesting
season for better machine utilization was impossible given the climate
in Zambia.
• There was pressure on management so much so that developing a
measure to determine the ideal timing of harvesting with the emphasis
on maximizing quality was not practical.
• The usage of harvesters required adjustments to pulpery (Wet Factory)
layout and other processing facilities to allow synchronised production.
This required additional capital
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• Developing harvester operating and transport systems to maximise
productivity was limited by other pressing production priorities.
Acquiring a harvester therefore was not well planned and was wastage of
resources.
3.1.2 Factories
The eventual aim was to achieve as near as possible an automatic factory;
feeding cherry in one end and with the minimum amount of handling green
bean out the other.
To achieve this, considerable investment was required. Each estate will have
its own milling facility allowing green bean to be produced and then
transported to a centralized blending facility. This will reduce transport costs
by 20% (as against parchment) and provide a portion of the fuel required by
the driers in the form of parchment husk.
The location of the processing facilities played a vital role in the reduction of
transport volume and distance. All factory elements will have to be
mechanized including that of drying (in 2001 it was sun drying). Drying and
driers represent the single largest investment in the factory system and was
designed along the lines of a grain handling facility able to handle in excess of
5000 tonnes green bean equivalent over a four month period.
Marketing decided that we must be able to accurately blend various types of
maximum value. With all varieties grown in all blocks this will only be possible
with wet factories designed to accept separately all the various varieties,
process them separately and finally blend them accurately. Each wet factory
will require a number of lines of equipment and adequate storage to enable
this separation to be maintained throughout the process. This will require a
properly designed grain handling facility with all necessary loading and
storage facilities.
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Due to financial distress all the above good intentions were abandoned,
varieties were mixed in the process and further automation of the factories
was abandoned. Driers were done just to the minimum standards and in the
end the quality gains from improved processing were lost.
3.1.3 Transport
The movement of goods in and out of Northern Zambia represents one of the
biggest costs and most difficult logistics issues to face APC in Zambia.
Transport represents fully one third of the fertilizer cost for the bulk commodity
fertilizers. It would be the Tanzania link to Oar es Salaam that should be used
to all Zambian imports and exports. However, it is universally recognized that
Tazara is poorly managed with theft and pilferage sometimes on a grand
scale being commonplace. Despite the above it is important that efforts
continue to force Tazara to work for APC. APC need to consider acquiring its
own handling facility in Oar es Salaam to process the import and export of our
goods. The company may well have to consider the purchase of its own rolling
stock and certainly container stock. Container stock into Zambia is restricted
and the majority of the containers in Zambia seldom come into Northern
Province.
In round figures the 2004 transport cost will be 5 000 tonnes of coffee out and
5000 tonnes of fertilizers and other imports in. Transport to Durban is about
$150 per tonne and to Oar es Salaam $55 per tonne by rail. The potential
saving is via Oar is in the region of $1,000,000 per annum.
APC will continue to pursue Tazara with the intention of using them.
Privatization of this rail link might happen. However, with the line being jointly
owned by Zambia and Tanzania this may take some time, if it ever happens.
There is recorded evidence that in the last year there is increased tonnage
moving through Tazara however the most difficult and expensive part of the
operation is moving the fertilisers to and from the rail head. The lack of any
bulk handling equipment and large transport necessitated the entire
consignment being offloaded manually both at railhead and on the farm.
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3.1.4 Research and Development
APC is already co-operating with both local and regional research institutions.
Contact is maintained with the Institute for Tropical and Subtropical Crops in
South Africa to monitor their progress with micro propagation. The research
station at Lyamungo in Tanzania has a huge library of Arabica varieties that
we can access for use in our selection work. Scientists have developed
successful CBO tolerant varieties such as Ruiru 11 in Kenya, a highbred
where each and every seed is the result of hand pollination of an individual
flower. Most new coffee varieties are tolerant of Leaf Rust and we are now
seeing the first offerings claiming tolerance to both diseases. (COO's report
2000)
By nature the plantation business is "long term" and the amount of time
needed to either improve or breed varieties explains the lack of progress in
the coffee industry over the last 100 years. To enable management to
priorities its R & 0 over time a discounting mechanism will be used to prioritise
work that will give the quickest returns.
(a) Improving quality versus reducing costs
For any R & 0 program to have the maximum effect it IS important to
understand the economics of the production system used. In order that it
prioritise the R & D effort effectively APC have attempted to demonstrate
where the focus should be in order to achieve maximum return per dollar of R
& D and the greatest benefit to APC's shareholders.
It is important to remember that while the results from costs reduction are
tangible "in the bag" those from quality improvements are to some extent
reliant on the market. For example, the premium for quality coffee over New
York C in 2000 was US$0.40/kg less than it was in 1998.
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(b) Priorities not driven directly by cost and quality
There are certain R & D priorities that are not driven directly by either cost or
quality. Mechanical Harvesting is a good example, while there is no doubt
that it will reduce the cost of production, will not physically be able to harvest
the cherry on time with the labour available. In such instances R & D into the
use of the machinery is a necessity. Irrigation efficiency especially where
water storage is limited is another area which will require R & D, the
implications of running short of water in low rainfall years are enormous in
coffee, as with machine harvesting there is obviously a cost saving too when
irrigation is optimized.
Machine harvesting - the performance of the harvester could be enhanced
by clones that flower and ripen uniformly, irrigation also has potential to
influence uniform ripening. Pruning systems may improve harvester
performance. Negative effects on quality will have to be minimized.
Irrigation - optimized irrigation management will not only save water, it can
also be used to bring on flowering, apply fertilizers and improve the vigour of
the plantation.
Cost Yield - there are of course many influences on yield, even if you
exclude genetics (varieties/clones), research into population, nutrition, disease
control, pest control, pruning and irrigation will have positive effect on yield in
only a few years.
Disease control - Coffee Berry Disease has already significantly reduced
yields within APC plantations, disease tolerant clones are the long term
solution, before then improved methods of spraying especially in the high
density coffees and better pruning systems will aid control.
Quality Main grade % - primarily influenced by variety with climate and soil
playing a role, low main grade percentage can significantly reduce average
price received.
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Cup quality - on commodity type coffees this has less influence, our coffee is
already sold into the premium market. The exception being in Malawi where
coffee is heavily discounted when compared to Zimbabwe and Zambia.
3.1.5 Genetics
It is clear from the analysis so far that plant selection and breeding (genetics)
will impact on all areas identified as R & D priorities with the exception of
irrigation.
Arabica coffee is a self-pollinator and natural coffee lines are therefore inbred
and seeds of these lines are in theory true to type.
In the six years that APC has been planting coffee and from their inherited
plantations it is clear that whilst the plants are similar there is variation in the
seed grown varieties that it use, probably due to contaminated seed sources.
It is also clear that even with the varieties that APC have, performance is
different over comparatively short distances.
It is believed that as a first step they should adopt a dual approach to
selection, on the one side selection based on yield will be specific to each
location and on the other, known Rust and Coffee Berry Disease tolerant
selections will be evaluated in each location for yield. Once high yielding,
disease tolerant selections have been identified they will be screened for
grade out percentage and cup quality before being released for extensive field
production. The next 4 years cross breeding of the most successful lines will
enhance their characteristics.
It is possible to carry out selections in the field and simply to reproduce these
plants by taking seed; this has been the traditional route for selection and is
how we currently select our seed. Obviously where hundreds of kilos of seed
are required it is taken from many trees each giving an average of 0.6 kilos
and this is where the variation starts. To reach a stage where APC could
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have commercial areas of coffee genetically identical to selections that they
are currently making will take nine years if they use seed and five if they use
vegetative methods. This could be reduced to four years with the use of
micro propagation methods currently under development in South Africa.
The principle reason for vegetative propagation not having been widely used
in the past is that coffee reproduction from cuttings (VP) although tried often
has not proved very successful. Cuttings are slow to root and develop inferior
root systems restricting both nutrient and water uptake. In recent years, Or
James Voss at the Institute for Tropical and Subtropical Crops in South Africa,
has been working on a method of rejuvenating mature coffee plants. With the
rejuvenated cuttings the physiology of the material used is similar to that of a
seedling with resources being channelled into developing root systems and a
frame work of branches rather than into cellulose reserves and reproduction
the priority of mature plants. At the Tea Research Foundation in Malawi
where they have developed methods to screen very young seedlings to test
their tolerance to disease, they have now taken the knowledge that cuttings
from juvenile plants do better than those from mature and developed a
vegetative propagation system that rapidly multiplies up the disease tolerant
clones.
All APC estates will in 2003 formally adopt a common screening system that
will identify high yielding plants on each estate and monitor them over the life
of the cycle. They will also seek out improved plant material from around the
world and assess its suitability in each of their locations. At the same time
they will improve their knowledge of vegetative propagation with the use of
high tech green houses to control temperature, humidity, radiation, etc.
Methods of screening seedlings for disease tolerance will be investigated and
trailed.
With financial distress all the above intentions did not take off and this affect
the future of the company. 31 % of the area under coffee today has varieties
prone to CBO and are yielding 83% below the intended yield per hectare.
Obvious this explains why APC can not meet its desired production levels.
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3.1.6 Irrigation efficiency
In most of its operations APC has either inherited or developed irrigation water
storage, in all cases historical climatic data has been analysed carefully to
determine a theoretical yield for each reservoir. For example, they aimed to
utilize between fifty percent of the capacity assuming that in low rainfall years
the reservoir will not fully recharge and anticipating the need to carry a
balance forward from good years. At the same time APC aims to maximize
the irrigable arable area on each of its projects.
On some projects such as Kateshi where they do not have storage and rely
solely on river flow the need for efficient irrigation is critical especially at the
end of the dry season. In addition, more efficient irrigation will reduce costs.
An important area for irrigation R & 0 will be its use to control flowering both
to create uniform flowering and consequent even ripening and to spread the
flowering out over a wider period of time leading to a reduced peak during
harvesting.
Areas to be covered by R & 0 program will cover: -
• Improve irrigation management with the use of automated weather
stations to calculate evapo-transpiration.
• Evaluate the use of mulch to reduce irrigation requirement.
• Compare coffee under different irrigation systems, for irrigation
efficiency, plant growth and yield
• Use of irrigation to control flowering
• Nutrition application using different methods of irrigation
• Research electricity tariffs and optimize pumping.
Again due to financial restrictions all areas of R & 0 were suspended and this
threatened the very existence of the company.
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3.1.7 Yield
The influences on yield are many and far-reaching. The area of genetics has
been covered above, in addition, population, nutrition, disease control
especially CBO, pest control, pruning and irrigation all have a bearing on yield.
The following priorities in addition to the selection and reproduction work
outlined already.
Construct trials to evaluate effects of population on different varieties over
time, this will be a more scientific analysis of what we are already doing in the
field. When this was performed the results showed that high populations
yielded reasonably in the first two years of production but are far low in the
subsequent years. In 2003 the company went into uprooting additional rows to
stimulate production.
(i) New chemicals and methods of application
The dwarf varieties planted by APC proved to be very susceptible to CBO, the
yields expected were therefore reduced significantly. APC had been loosing
20% of its crop every year due to CBO.
The effectiveness of chemicals was also affected by the type of equipment
used and the size of the bush. Huge investment went into spraying equipment
but this did not reduce the impact of disease leaving the company to consider
changing the varieties as the only viable option.
(ii) Disease control
Inability to control disease significantly impacts on yield and consequently
cost. COB control cost APC US$500 000 a year by 2003 on existing projects.




From the economic analysis of the last two years actual grade out
percentages and prices received it is clear that there is a significant
advantage to improving main-grade percentage.
The potential to improve quality with better genetics is clear and screening for
quality will certainly be part of the selection program. There are areas that
APC can concentrate on immediately, these include a thorough understanding
of the quality of our existing varieties in each location, the impact of better
nutrition and irrigation on quality and a study on the cost of uncontrolled pest
and disease outbreaks on quality. Severe antestia or CBO will significantly
impact on grades and prices.
It is recommended that a complete review of quality, both grade percentages
and liquor on all APC estates is carried out continuously this work must be
checked against previous years and also in subsequent years as part of the
quality control system. Findings will assist in determining varieties and later
clones to be planted commercially. Quality will also be monitored in the
nutrition and irrigation trials to determine effect.
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3.2 FINANCIAL POLICY
The financial and ultimate goal for APC is to maximise shareholders value and
provide high capital appreciation for its investors.
APC introduced debt into their capital structure in 2000 from International
Finance Corporation (IFC) $2,5million and another $3million from Swiss
Development Finance Corporation (SDFC). At the introduction of debt the
total project cost was estimated at $15million and a total of 1 624 hectares
were agreed to be planted in order to complete the project. These loans set
the level of debt allowable to the company at 60:40 and the current ratio at
1.2: 1 and a debt service ratio of not more than 1.25. The debt ratio was
defined in loan agreements as Long term debt over shareholders funds plus
Long term debt. Shareholders funds include all reserves both capital and
revenue. Current Ratio is defined as Current assets divided by Current
liabilities.
At the time of these loan agreements, the shareholders had already put
$10,8million into the business and so part of the loan proceeds was used to
refund them. A total of $1 ,3million was refunded to the shareholders in order
to achieve the new financial structure.
A total of $1,5million was received in June 2000 and it accrued interest of
$72k in the P& L to December of the same year. The other loan of $3million
was received on 27 December 2000 and therefore did not earn interest by the
cut off date. Since 39% Debt was introduced into capital of the company the
Weighted Average Cost Capital fell from 13% to 9% in 2000 (Fig 2.0). In the
subsequent year 2001 the level of debt increased to $5.5million with an
additional loan from IFC of $1 million. This increased the debt equity ratio to
50% and the cost of capital rose to 10%, the distortion is brought about by the
timing of the additional loan. The 10% is still lower than 13%, had the capital
structure was equity only. The depletion of equity due to accumulated losses
is the sole reason why the debt equity ratio changed. This can be traced back
to the poor coffee price. When the agreements were made the coffee price
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was expected to remain at levels of above $2/kg. This did not happened
prices fell to an average of $1.16/kg and the existing shareholders have to
fund the cash flow deficit due to price fall. In 2001 shareholders came in with a
short term loan of $1 ,6million with the hope that the business will be able to
cover this from its turnover. The price crushed and this money was at risk. In
a normal business additional equity would reduce the debt equity ratio but the
losses incurred due to poor prices were very high and reduced the
shareholders funds significantly and pushed the debt equity ratio to 50%. The
coffee crisis for APC can therefore be attributable to the coffee price than the
debt burden. Debt only accelerated the underlying industry problem.
3.2.1 Financial Distress Risks
APC started experiencing financial distress in 2001 when the debt level rose
to 50%. In June 2001 the company defaulted on IFC loan repayment of $156
000. However it managed to pay SDFC their instalment in May. This was the
beginning of the problems. The major disadvantages of taking on higher levels
of debt were started to be felt company wide and this increased the risk of
financial distress and ultimately liquidation. This had detrimental effects on
both the equity and the debt holders. Due to the financial distress many
obligations were not met or were met with difficulty.
Customers
I & M Smith has been always the biggest customer for APC taking more than
70% of the crop every year. They looked at the security of future supplies of
the commodity and made alternative arrangement. They could not give any
further forward contracts to the company. This removed the company from its
hedged position creating further risk. Though the tonnage on forward
contracts was very small the idea was self destructive.
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Creditors
The balance sheet on table 2 shows that the highest creditor balance was in
2001 an indication of the financial distress. The company failed to pay most its
suppliers and the results were predictable. Omnia Ltd and Sasol Ltd are the
two biggest suppliers of fertilisers in Zambia, they decided to hold their
supplies unless APC could pay all the outstanding amounts and interest. They
demanded that all future purchases by the company must be on cash upfront
basis. The relationship was damaged and up to now APC has not managed to
repair the damage. APC could not get the much needed inputs on the market
further destroying the very critical part of the business, the coffee fields. Once
coffee is not fed at the right time it is very unforgiving crop and will punish you
for the next two seasons. The very future of APC was doomed. Chemical
suppliers stopped their supplies and crop management was affected and this
led to lower yields and poor quality.
Employees
From October 2001 the company laid off most of the seasonal employees,
outsourced workshop and other non core activities. The general employee
morale was significantly affected. Management on the other hand were very
de-motivated. The Managing Director resigned in November, following two
other expatriate Estate Managers. Two more expatriate managers left in
January 2002. The staff which remained was stressed up and holding more
than one position. The finance decisions were hand to mouth while two
options were being sought, one was waiting to effect the receivership of the
company, and secondly to look for a medium to long-term finance, possibly a
new investor. Managers spent most of the time fire fighting - dealing with
day to day liquidity problems and focusing on short term cash flow rather than
long term shareholder wealth creation.
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Lenders
No bank was interested in giving short term finance, the shareholder have
neglected the company and would not issue any guarantee for any loan short
or long. Banks perceived high risk of default since the coffee price was
showing no signs of immediate recovery. Due to covenants imposed by the
IFC loan no additional debt was to be taken in order to maintain the agreed
structure.
3.2.2 Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC)
At low levels of debt the major influence on the overall cost of capital is the
cheaper after tax cost of debt. As gearing rises investors become more
concerned about the risk of financial distress and therefore the required rate
of return rise. The fear of loss factor becomes of overriding importance at high
gearing levels. Most of APC shareholders by third quarter of 2001 were more
worried about their exit route, than any return and they could not get this due
to the specialised assets of the industry. They wanted to salvage something
but the level of gearing was too high to guarantee them anything. They
stopped the hand outs which they were giving to the Zambian operation and
by November 2001 they threw their towel and decided to loose everything.
The October 23, 2001 board meeting refused to approve the following year
budget, a signal that they were no longer interested in the business. In normal
circumstances shareholders demand a higher return when debt levels
increase but for APC they could not demand anything. For the purposes of
this paper the return on equity is assumed to remain constant at 13% since no
information is available.
The WACC for APC does not agree with the financial theory that the cost of
capital decreases as more debt is taken. At debt levels of 39% the WACC is
9%, however WACC increases as debt- equity ratio increase. It therefore
follows that there is a certain level of debt which is health and acceptable to a
typical industry. Debt level of 40% is ideal for the coffee industry. It must be
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noted that the high debt levels for APC were due to losses incurred and not
additional borrowing. The losses are a result of poor commodity price on the
world market which reduced expected revenues.
The cost of debt has been calculated as the total interest charge in the Profit
and Loss account divided by the outstanding loans in the balance sheet.
However from the loan agreements loans had the following interest.
• International finance Corporations Libor + 4.5% pa floating
• Swiss development Finance Corporation 8% fixed pa
• Saxonian Estate Ltd 11 % fixed pa
The IFC and SDFC loans are secured against Isanyaand Ngoli Estates but
the SEL loan have no security and it's on short term basis. The SDFC loan is
subordinate to the IFC loan.
The factors which influenced different cost of debt can be found in the nature
and the risks associated with the business as follows:
• APC revenues are very sensitive to the general movement of
commodity prices, though it has achieved higher than average NYC
coffee price. The shareholders and lenders have also perceived a
greater risk of liquidation or distress hence their demand for higher
returns in compensation for gearing. The business itself could not
afford any additional cost of capital, restructuring was necessary.
• APC cost of production has a higher proportion of fixed costs, which
means it is highly operationally geared and lenders and equity holders
demand high returns. Once a plantation is established it has to be
managed in terms of pests, weeds, diseases, you still have to fertilise
and irrigate it whether it is producing or not. These costs are not
directly related to volume of production. The variable costs are mainly
in factories and distribution, but contribute very little to the final cost
structure of the company
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• The movable and non-movable assets of the company are specialised
and are not very easy to dispose. This is further worsened by the fact
that Agriculture in Zambia is not all that good, many property agents
are sitting with a lot of farms in receivership and no-one in the market is
willing to pick them up. Recently however the government have started
encouraging Zimbabwe disposed farmers to come into Zambia. But the
location of APC is not that attractive. Northern Province enjoys the best
rainfall pattern in the country but it's located very far from the markets
for low value crops like maize, wheat beans etc to be viable. All high
value crops like tea need substantive investment which creates a
barrier to entry and as result disposing assets for APC is very difficult.
The lender seeing this risk obviously demands a higher return.
• The cash generating capability of APC is seasonal and unless debt
repayments are structured to coincide with the seasonality of cash, it
will pose a big cash flow problem. The two long term loans APC have
did not take into account these very important factors which influence
the risk of financial distress. Alternatively some additional crop like tea
which is perennial could have been brought as product line to provide
cash flow diversity.
• Borrowing capacity. At the time the company had mortgaged two of
its prime estates to IFC and SDFC, the biggest estate Kateshi was free
but income generation capacity of the whole company was hampered
by the coffee price. At the time of restructuring only Kateshi was a
genuine security the company can use for further borrowing.
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3.2.3 FINANCIAL RESTRUCTURING (March 2002)
Operating and strategic decisions are generally the prime determinants of
company value, and not financing decision. We have noted that the main
problem was coffee price above and not the financing decision. Further
arguments can be put on the viability of the project itself in the face of the
commodity price crisis.
In 2002 due to the financial distress created by the coffee price, the capital
was restructured. The main details of the new structure were as follows.
• IFC the leading lender forgave 50% of its principal debt outstanding
and 50% of the accumulated interest. The interest rate and security
remained ~ per the loan agreement.
~
• The new APC shareholders introduced equity to refinance the
business. A total of $1 612 000 was issued to the new shareholders.
This described as shareholders loans in the balance sheet. The loan
has no interest charge, no security or repayment term, hence qualify to
be equity in character and substance.
• The old APC shareholders also forgave 50% of their shareholders
loans of $11 358 000 (Equity for this paper include share capital,
shareholders loans and all reserves see Table 2).
• SDFC the subordinate lender agreed to capitalise its interest and
forgave nothing, however agreed to receive interest only if the coffee
price have reached a certain level. This understanding is a pointer to
what the real "factor behind the coffee crisis in Zambia.
This restructuring reduced the gearing ratio to 48% in 2002, and the slight
reduction in debt -equity ratio increased the WACC to 11 % from 10% in the
previous year. The reduction of ratio again is attributable to the continued
losses from the business which reduced the level of equity visa versa debt.
Short term borrowings are not included for the purposes of this paper, since
they are paid within twelve months.
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It can be concluded that the shareholders value can be maximised at debt
levels of below 40%, since that when the WACC is the lowest.
In 2003 more expensive debt was introduced from SEL to bring the ratio up to
53% but this did not change the WACC, because the cost of debt came at the
same level as equity cost. Both debt holders and shareholders from this
period onwards perceived the same financial distress risk and they ask higher
returns to compensate for the risk.
As debt reduces the cost of capital start to reduce in 2004 and 2005.
(projections are used here and can not be relied upon). At a debt level of
about between 25% and 39% APC,s cost of capital is lowest. Implying that is
the optimal capital structure for the company. The accumulated losses
increased leverage ratio in APC capital structure.
3.2.4 Commodity Price
The historical figures on Fig 1.2 show that from 1996 when APC was
incorporated the coffee price was at USC109/lb and at this price the industry
was very attractive for new farmers to enter. The production world wide
increased from 70million x 60kg bags to 90 million in 2002. The supply of
coffee is the major influence to the price. As supply increased the price was
decreasing from USC109/lb to USC48/Lb. The lowest price was recorded in
2001 and this is the year APC went into financial distress. There is a
relationship between APC gearing ratio and the movement in coffee price.
The low commodity price created a cash flow deficit which necessitated
raising more capital either debt or equity for working capital for the plantations.
The information cost of raising equity from shareholders forced the company
to go for point of less resistance according to the pecking order theory. It is
the commodity price which had more impact on the APC financial distress. Fig
2.0 shows that the debt ratio is low during the years when coffee prices are
above cost of production. As long as the coffee industry does not make profit,
the shareholder funds decrease against the debt creating an impression of
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increase in debt. This is so because the cash short fall caused by low prices
have to be financed by someone either debt or equity.
3.2.5 Currency Risk
World coffee trade is expressed in United States Dollars and many producing
countries have their currencies unlinked to the dollar hence exporters are
exposed to currency risk. Usually currency risk is limited by borrowing in the
currency of the sale. African Plantations Company's cost of production is
mainly US$ and the Zambian Kwacha is floated to the US$. All borrowings are
in the US$ and this has created a disadvantage to the company. Many African
currencies depreciate from time to time and this has traditionally given an
advantage to international companies who export dollar commodity because
the local currency loan will also depreciate with the currency. APC is not
enjoying the same devaluation benefits of an exporting company.
APC have however enjoyed transactions advantages when they received their
hard currency export proceeds. The company was exposed to translation risk
for mainly US$ denominated loans. This have affected their balance sheet for
the years until 2001 when the company changed its reporting currency to US$
and using a multicurrency account system. Though borrowing in hard
currency helped to reduce the cost of debt compared to local currency, this
did not give APC the much needed devaluation advantages.
The financial restructuring did not bring the solutions needed for the coffee
crisis for APC and the industry at large. The solution does not come from a




Approach the market directly by selling to roasters rather than through Agents
and Brokers.
It clear that the success of APC can be to a greater extend attributable to the
success of their marketing strategy. The function was taken away from the
company level and was done at group level to command high volumes of
product. This left the management at operational level without experience to
handle marketing of the product they produced. Before 2002 this function was
handled by Head offices in Harare and London. The ultimate aim is to achieve
a price above total cost of production. Commodity prices are still very low to
cover cost of production. Table 3 (P& L) gives average prices achieved by
APC over the past years. The price had been decreasing year after year
irregardless of quality improving each year. Conventional thinking will say as
quality improves the price of the commodity increase to compensate extra
effort in producing high quality. This has not been with APC, while
considerable effort was put to cover operational efficiency and consequently
producing better quality year on year this has not been reflected in the prices
achieved. A more coherent marketing policy is required to achieve a
recognised market position in terms of quality and volume.
The general concept of building brand image in any given market, i.e.
specially, quality supermarket, etc. remains the best way of moving our coffee
at above market prices. APe needs to sell its coffee not as a commodity and
to achieve this various strategies have been recommend in Chapter 5 of this
research.
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Chapter 4 Evaluation of APC Financial Policy
4.1 Does the financial policy create value?
From an investor standpoint the best financial structure must (a) maximise
shareholder wealth (b) maximise the value of the entire firm and (c) minimise
the firms weighted average cost of capital
Elements of Current Investor View Evaluation/Comments
Financial Structure
Structure 2002
Mix Debt /Equity= Maximise wealth • Tax shields can not be
48% and minimise utilised due to huge
WACC= 12% WACC losses. /
Debt!Assets= • Value is maximised at
47% debt levels below 40%
where WACC is 9%;
hence fmancial distress
have destroyed value






• The inability of APC






• The Capital Structure
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need to be adj usted to
move closer to the
optimum structure of
40%
Maturity Ave. 4 yrs Where value consist • The life of debt is not
of growth the same as the life of
opportunities lack of the assets.
flexibility caused by • Debt with short
long term loans can maturity, less
destroy value. High restrictive covenants,
interest rates security, more
associated with long convertible and call
term loans increase provisions ensures
the risk to greater financial
shareholders. Short flexibility.
term debt has low • IFC loans have too
interest and less risk much restrictive
covenants
Basis 62% of debt is Cost of debt too In periods of declining interest
fixed rate high therefore rates like the past two years
destroy value floating rates reduce the cost
of debt hence create value
The burden of servicing debt




Currency Capital is in Currency APC's choice of currency for
US$ movements can debt does not take advantage
destroy value ofkwacha devaluations.
especially
transactional risk.
Exotica Bank loans Use of cheaper Limited access to cheaper
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and financial financial instruments left the
shareholder instruments create company with only one option
loans, very value to borrow from Banks
little use of
lease finance
External 96% of debt is All assets of the Lack of security capacity to
Control secured company are borrow prevents further
mortgaged investments in projects which
create value. Value can be
created by increasing the area
under coffee and bring in
more disease tolerant varieties
but it has no more debt
capacity.
Distribution No dividend No return (income Value entails dividend streams
paid so far and capital) to to investor, so APC have
shareholder destroys destroyed value.
value
4.2 Does the financial policy create competitive advantage?
Financial structure can enhance or constrain competitive advantage mainly by
opening or foreclosing avenues of competitive response over time. There is
need to critically assess the strategic options created or destroyed by a
particular financial structure. Knowing competitors financial structures give a
good bench mark of evaluating APC position in the market however
information gathering from competitors is beyond the scope of this research.
For APC, as already outlined in Operational Review, the financial policy did
not support the strategic goals of producing 5 000 tonnes of high quality
coffee at a cheap price. Money run out and Research and Development which
was key to achieving the objective of the company was abandoned. This
destroyed value and made APC less competitive.
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4.3 Does the financial policy sustain the vision of senior management
The internal perspective tests the appropriateness of a capital structure from a
standpoint of the expectations and capacities of the corporate organisation
itself. A good financial structure meets the classic maxim of corporate finance
"Don't run out of cash" in other words the ideal financial structure adequately
funds growth goals and dividends payouts of the firm without severely diluting
the firm's current equity owners.
The long term goal APe was to plant 2000 hectares which will produce 5 000
tonnes of coffee in five years from 1999. The business plan for achieving this
goal called for careful investment into mechanisation and crop genetics
through R & D. But the financial policy of the company could not offer any
flexibility to support this ideal model.
A good financial policy is concerned with (a) the preservation of the firm's
financial flexibility, (b) the sustainability of the firm's financial policies and (c)
the feasibility of the firm's strategic goals.
Elements of Current Internal View Evaluation/Comments
Financial Structure 2002
Structure
Mix Debt /Equity= Target ratio is Pecking order theory is
48% 40% at which applicable. No reserves are
WACC= 12% cost of capital is available and the next line of
Debt!Assets= cheapest. less resistance is debt. Issuing
47% Management debt is not giving any signalling
goal is to expand intentions but is the only
area under coffee available option at any cost.
and produce 5 Cost of capital and financial
000 t high quality distress cost brought about by
coffee at low the financial structure are
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cost. contrary to management
objectives.
Maturity Ave. 4 yrs Preference is to As a strategy each plantation life
match Debt is 7 years but the average debt
maturity to life of life is 4 years, this means debt
assets matures well before plantations
can full produce to cater for
repayments.
The cash generating capacity of
APC is seasonal but debt
servicing is not structured to
coincide with cash flows.
Basis 62% of debt is Preference would No financial flexibility at fixed
fixed rate be floating rate rates when the general global
interest rates trends are
declining.
Currency Capital is in US$loan are Devaluation of kwacha is
US$ cheaper certain and exchange gains are
compared to not taken advantage of. Since
kwacha the first loan the kwacha
devalued by 187% this could
represent reductions in real
loans if loans were in local
currency
Exotica Bank loans and Management Choice is limited by
shareholder preference could macroeconomic stage of the
loans, very be simple and nation.
little use of cheap




External 96% of debt is Equity is This shows how APC is highly
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Control secured forgiving but inflexible in terms of financing.






Distribution No dividend No profit The self sustainable growth
paid so far model is not applicable since no
return on equity is available
Financial flexibility is measured by the excess cash and unused debt capacity
on which the firm might call. In addition to this there may be other reserves
such unused land or excess stocks of raw materials which can be liquidated at
reasonable notice to exploit unusual surprising opportunities. APC do not
have excess cash due to poor coffee prices and have no excess debt
capacity. All the properties which are saleable have been mortgaged and





FLEXIBILITY This implies ability to meet unforeseen financing
requirements as they arise, these requirements maybe
favourable or unfavourable. Flexibility may involve liquidating
assets or tapping the capital markets in adverse market
environment or both. APC has no saleable assets and have
no debt capacity so it is financially not flexible.
The company have consistently been making losses as a
result high debt ratios are expected since according to
perking order theory the capital structure of any given






and its investment requirements. In this case the commodity
price has a much significant role in financial distress.
The predictable variability In the firm's business, such
variability maybe due to both macroeconomic and industry or
firm specific factors. The coffee price have been the
industry's highest risk factor however high leverage in APC
amplified the predictable business swings.
APC revenues are very sensitive to the general movement of
commodity price and no deliberate policy to manage this risk
is clearly defined in the company.
Income is coming from one single commodity whose
performance is very poor therefore to diversify income source
is very critical if capital is available.
Less profitable companies with large financing requirements
tend to have high leverage ratios.
Alternative financial structures may imply changes in control.
From 1996 to 1999, APC was 100% equity financed and the
shareholders full ownership of the company. From 2000
onwards control of the company was constrained by debt
covenants. APC is restricted to pursue any projects that
might increase value.
Alternative financial structures available for adoption by any
firm are depended on the capital market environment. Trends
in treasury yield, interest rates etc give a signal of the timing
of implementing a certain structure. APC borrowed 2000
when the interest rates were very high, (Iibor was 4% and its
now 1.8% ). This was a wrong timing of which going fixed
rate was an additional error.
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international coffee prices and there has been increased interest in identifying
means to increase and/or stabilize coffee-related incomes (Giovanucci, 2002).
"Diversification" is often been mentioned as a solution to the problems of low
and/or fluctuation coffee prices. However, when the term is loosely used, it
really means that producers need to "change" their existing activities. To
identify appropriate strategies, it is important to understand the different ways
that coffee producers can "diversify" or "change" their activities to achieve
higher and/or more stable incomes.
There are different ways to increase and stabilize incomes of farmers through
diversification. It is possible to diversify within coffee and diversify out of
coffee. However, to avoid confusion with the term diversification, we will refer
to diversification within coffee as "increased competitiveness" and
diversification out of coffee as "diversification." Of course, it is also possible
for coffee producers to opt for a diversified strategy that combines increased
competitiveness within coffee long with the introduction of other activities.
An important aspect of strategies aimed at increased competitiveness and
diversification is to increase the flexibility of crop and livestock systems and
the allocation of household labour and capital so that changes in activities,
technologies, enterprise mixes and financial and marketing arrangements can
be undertaken in response to changing conditions at relatively low transaction
costs (Barghouti, Timmer, Siegel, 1990; Timmer, 1992). As Timmer (1992, p.
37) notes: increased competitiveness and diversification are processes of
change over time and not the setting of specific production targets.
Raising and stabilizing incomes of agricultural producers is (are) the goal(s) -
not increasing production statistics. The processes of increased bottleneck is
not usually supply constraints. Instead, the processes of increased value
through quality improvements, improving financing and marketing
arrangements and post-harvest practices. As a process of change over time,
in the short-term is important to exploit the strengths of existing farming
systems and introduce incremental changes before attempting to introduce
radical far-reaching changes.
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A point of clarification needs to be made between the terms diversification and
specialization. One of the basic tenets of economic theory is the gains (i.e.
increased returns) achieved through specialization according to comparative
advantage. However, specialization (and higher returns) can lead to higher
exposure to risks (e.g. greater variability of returns). Thus, there is a potential
risk-return trade-off that might encourage some diversification and/or the use
of some risk management strategies (see Siegel and Alwang, 1999, p. 23 -
41).
Another point of clarification is that costs and benefits of specialization and
diversification need to be considered at the farm/household level along with
community/regional and national levels. It is also quite clear that specializing
in a very profitable activity might make economic sense, while diversifying into
activities with low profitability is not such a good choice.
Finally, it is important to recognize that specialization and diversification
strategies can have significant social and environmental impacts at the
different levels. The potential dangers of specializing on one or a few
agricultural commodity crops has long been recognized and efforts to promote
diversification are not new to coffee producers. Over the last thirty years,
efforts to promote diversification at different levels have been made and have
had varying degrees of success in the region.
In this paper, attention is focused on producer (APC) efforts towards
increased competitiveness and diversification (with most of the attention
devoted to increasing competitiveness). It is critical to acknowledge that there
are very different opportunities and constraints facing different producers in
the Zambian Coffee Industry. Clearly, this justifies further analyses into issues
of increased competitiveness and diversification.
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5.1 DIVERSIFICATION
Diversification means changing what is produced on the farm - switching to
alternative crop and livestock enterprises on the farm. But also, diversification
means changing labour/capital allocation to off-farm activities - switching to
agricultural and/or non-agricultural activities off the farm in the area or through
migration (temporary or permanent).
Thus, diversification includes any agricultural activity or practical combination
of activities not related to coffee production that will generate positive net
income on the farm.
For non-competitive coffee producers, diversification could be a viable
alternative to achieve economic sustainability in the medium to long run. The
term "non-competitive" is used here to describe coffee farms that cannot
compete in world markets, either because their agro-c1imatic conditions or
cost structure does not allow them to be profitable when competing in the
"commodity" segment of the market or because they cannot produce coffees
to compete in the "high quality" segment of the market.
The actual strategy selected - either increased competitiveness of
diversification - to be pursued in any country will depend on the structure of
the coffee sector (e.g. producer profiles, technologies, skills mix of agricultural
labourers), agro-ecological conditions of different producers, the public
sector's agricultural support services (e.g. financial extension), transport and
communication infrastructure, the private sector (e.g. financial and marketing
sectors) and the regulatory environment, etc. It is critical to emphasize the
dangers of adopting a strategy of "picking the winners" or equivalently, of
"picking the losers" (see Barghouti, Timmer, Siegel, 1990). For example,
there has been some discussion about trying to phase out coffee production
at altitudes under 800 metres, or to try and promote vegetable and flower
production as an alternative to coffee. It is important for governments to
provide enabling conditions for producers to make the "right" decisions, while
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eliminating distortionary signals and improving the overall competitive
environment for the agricultural and rural sectors.
One issue to consider is that at this stage, it may be difficult to start
considering the possibility of growing alternative crops that require different
skills, machinery and equipment, support services, etc. Instead of the
strategy should be to identify alternative markets for coffee and consider
options for new markets, including transforming coffee into higher-value
products. At this point in time it maybe more realistic to make incremental
changes in farming and post-harvest practices (aimed at increasing
productivity and the quality of outputs) and more sophisticated efforts in
marketing and financial arrangements, including improved post-harvest
processing, storage and transport technologies and arrangements.
For either improving competitiveness in coffee or diversifying out of coffee, the
public sector can have an important role in providing public goods such as
information (e.g. research and extension) and infrastructure. The private
sector - both domestic and foreign - should take lead in identifying
opportunities and facilitating the adoption of appropriate technologies and
arranging for financial and marketing arrangements. What might be needed
are match-makers (e.g. firms with knowledge of local conditions and links with
domestic and foreign entrepreneurs) who can identify opportunities and help
match private sector firms with producers and producer groups.
The public sector need to make sure that macroeconomic conditions and legal
framework are conducive for domestic and foreign firms. Also, the public
sector needs to continue investing in transport and communication
infrastructure to lower transaction costs and increase competitiveness. Some
of the investment in transportation and communication infrastructure could be
coordinated at the community level, along with investments in infrastructure
for improved water and sanitation and improved education and health as part
of a comprehensive broad-based rural development strategy.
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5.2 INCREASED COMPETITIVENESS
There are several options for increasing the competitiveness of producers by
changing technologies mixes and marketing/financial arrangements and post-
harvest practices. These options are not easy to carry out, but do have the
advantage of allowing producers to continue "specializing" in coffee
production.
Increased competitiveness can include activities such as: -
(a) Changing how coffee is produced - adoption of improved production
technologies to increase productivity and/or quality of the product. Also,
improving overall returns from land use through inter-planting with other crops
and livestock.
(b) Changing business relationships in the financing and marketing of
coffee - using alternative financing and marketing arrangements including
alternative organizational structures (e.g. cooperatives, associations) to lower
transactions costs and to increase value added received by producers. To this
effect ZCGA need to be more commercially oriented than just a statutory body
overseeing marketing of coffee. Also, use of risk management instruments to
enhance financial and marketing arrangements.
(c) Changing the form of final coffee product - adoption of new and
improved post-harvest technologies for coffee (e.g. processing, packing,
storage, transport) that adds to the net value of coffee for producers.
(d) Identifying alternative uses for coffee - identification of processing
technologies that convert coffee into new "coffee products" (e.g. iced coffee,
coffee candies and confectionaries), eco-tourism based in coffee growing




By adopting a quality orientation that differentiates their coffees, producers
can improve their overall position in international markets through enhanced
reputation and higher differentials relative to the New York Board of Trade "C"
contract that sets the benchmark market price for these coffees. However,
even with some improvements in quality, success is by no means guaranteed.
Many producers are struggling with the low market price that is now intrinsic to
their common positions as raw material suppliers are seeking to advance in
the same direction. Even Brazil, the world's largest supplier of coffee as a
commodity, is consistently investing in improved quality. Any country strategy
must take into account the competitive direction of market leaders.
Although quality may be the sine qua non for Zambia's coffee future, there are
also other ways by which it can differentiate itself and seek competitive
advantages. To be able to enter and develop the emerging higher revenue
segments of the market with differentiated coffee requires the development of
value-added strategies and marketing that distinguish Zambian coffee from
those of other parts of the world. This will require a serious commitment to
invest and move forward quickly in order to establish any early advantage
over competitors before the field gets crowded. It will also require a wide
.scale sectoral commitment that includes both government and the private
sector in order to maintain a consistent focus over the years it takes to build a
unique position or "brand" recognition for the country. Before designing such
strategies it is important to understand the characteristics and trends of the
consuming markets and where demand is trending.
Currently the differentiated or specialty markets import roughly 6 - 8 million
bags representing about 7 - 10% of the developed markets and slightly less
of total world consumption. However, these coffees represent a much larger
percentage of profits. In the U. S. for example, the specialty coffee markets
accounts for less than 20% of actual green bean imports but nearly 50% of
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coffee sector profits. A significant proportion of Central America's production
could potentially access these markets. Although not all producers would be
capable of participating, for some producers, especially smaller ones, the
increased income - ranging from 5% to 100% above market prices - would be
appreciable. Although at today's prices a producer that can sell certified
organic and fair trade would double his income, these markets are still
relatively small and such extra margins are unlikely to remain at that level for
more than a few years.
Finally, an important issue related to improved competitiveness is the ability of
farmers to deal with price uncertainty. Ways to reduce price uncertainty could
be provide greater flexibility in marketing of coffee, improve access to
financing and could also perhaps contribute to better terms of financing.
The structural nature of the coffee crisis and the impact of the crisis in the
poverty of thousands of families in the rural areas make development of the
rural economy the centre-piece of strategies to overcome the crisis.
Supporting quality improvements in regions with potential is a centrepiece of a
strategy to cope with the current crisis. This need to be supported with
appropriate promotion and marketing and effective public policy and
investment instruments, private investment and backing from civil society and
NGOs.
A strategy that supports quality improvements is key for Zambia for several
reasons.
First and foremost, because of the favourable agro-ecological conditions of
the Northern Province highlands, the region has a comparative advantage in
this segment of the coffee market. Second, consistent quality coffee fetches a
price premium. Third, improvements in quality can also drive increases in
consumption.
Finally, improvements in competitiveness, such as improving coffee quality,
may have positive externalities in the agricultural and rural sector.
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Improvements in quality can help Zambian national coffee sellers develop and
strengthen their long-term relationships with exporters, importers and retailers
and increase their ability to negotiate prices, including premiums for quality.
Improving quality can also help ZCGA develop direct links and access to
international markets.
In evaluating quality, a key issue according to the study by International Trade
Centre (2002), is improved education of farmers and establishment of local
cupping laboratories on producing regions or farms. Physical evaluation and
cupping are procedures performed by coffee importers on samples that they
receive before shipment. One key element to improving and maintaining
quality is developing the capacity to evaluate coffee with the same standards
as the buyers. In addition to this, assuring commercial consistency in lots and
confidence in delivery, are essential to developing long-term relationship with
buyers.
According to the same study, improving quality has two main areas; (a)
improving quality in primary production; and (b) improving quality in coffee
milling.
The key elements in improving quality in primary production involve: -
• Adequate preparation of coffee before and during harvest. This
involves appropriate cultural and harvesting practices to ensure quality.
Incentives for producing quality coffee in terms of a compensation
system that recognizes and reward quality differences and effectively
transmits price signals to producers.
• Improvements in transportation so deter quality deterioration
during transport of cherries to the wet mills or coffee coming from wet
mills
Support of producer organizations in developing organizational and
cooperative approaches that will help improve managerial problems and
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improve quality. For example, ZCGA can disseminate quality standards and
best practices in coffee farm care and harvest. Support the production of
differentiated coffees by supporting necessary extension, training and
certification of these coffees.
The key elements in improving quality coffee in coffee milling include:
• Investments in appropriate equipment and practices to protect and
enhance coffee quality.
• Cupping laboratories and training sessions established at the coffee
mills to better evaluate the quality.
• Strengthening business and marketing practices at the mills so they
better promote quality coffee and transmit rewards to farmers who
deliver better quality.
• Improve the cup quality of Zambia's green coffee bean to be in higher
demand by the bar/shop grinders, coffee roasters and green coffee
traders/merchants.
• Identify and promote a coffee variety that gives the best cup quality,
despite yield levels per tree. Arabica typical for Jamaica is low yielding
but gives the best cup. Large quantities of coffee with poor cup only
reduce the value of Zambia coffee.
• Identify specific geographic areas that consistently produce coffee of
the highest cup quality. Legally define and recognize coffee from such
areas by a special status that reflects the high quality. Rigorously
control the quality. Coffee produced outside the geographic area, even
if it came from the same variety should not be of the same status (as
factors such as terrain, soil characteristics, elevation, rainfall) contribute
to the cup quality.
• Encourage and teach smallholder farmers how to grow low yield coffee
of the highest quality. Low yields ensure the intensity of aroma and a
harmonious balance between the body of the coffee, on the one hand,
and acidity and bitterness on the other that leads to a long aftertaste
and the overall deliciousness and exciting flavour of the coffee cup.
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5.2.2 Increased Value Added
For decades, most countries have passively accepted their role as a supplier
of green bean in world coffee markets. Meanwhile, on the demand side of the
market, roasters have shown a remarkable capacity to add enormous value to
green beans, by targeting increasingly segmented and fragmented consumer
markets. As a result, multinationals and firms in consuming nations have
captured huge downstream margins. Meanwhile, producers' share of total
value has declined considerably; from approximately 30 percent to less than
10 percent in the last two decades (Giovannucci 2002). To increase their
share of total value and to add value, producers need to simultaneously
develop downstream supply chain linkages and pursue promotion strategies
that feature their coffee's comparative advantages. Following are some
approaches and some cautions for all Zambian producers to consider:
(i) Working with retailers.
Certain countries could work directly with retailers. Indeed, retailers' ability to
develop private labels and otherwise bypass the traditional trading channels is
fast emerging as a critical competitive factor. Such labels are taking a fast
increasing share of grocery sales, even at the high-end of the market.
Moreover, they do not require costly market entries or direct competition with
current buyers. But there are demanding requirements in terms of quality,
packaging and "just in time" fulfilment that could be a difficult hurdle. Thus,
only the more organized, companies, producer groups and associations will
have the capacity to deal with retailers directly.
(ii) The specialty market
It is often neither viable nor possible to add value to green coffee by
processing at origin. Many coffees are suitable only for blending or
processing into neutral or anonymous end products. For such coffees it is not
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possible to add monetary value as prices are determined solely by market
conditions. However, reliable and consistent grading procedures, strict
compliance with contractual obligations and regular delivery will add value in
the sense that the product will be preferred by primary buyers over those from
less consistent origins. Certain growths of coffee may be highly prized for
their flavour characteristics and attract a suitable premium. Examples include
Jamaican Blue Mountain, Hawaii Kona, Top Kenya AA and Guatemalan
Antiguas.
Some of these growths attract extremely high premiums. Jamaican Blue
Mountain attracts such a large premium that the unit value of coffee exported
from Jamaica in 2001 was over 13_ times higher than the average of all 'other
mild producers and more than 16 times higher than the average achieved by
all origins. The top Kenyan grades regularly achieve prices more than double
that achieved by other growers. Colombia has adopted an active marketing
and publicity policy which has resulted in many brands throughout the world
being labelled as 100% Colombian. Besides the promotional effort, the
availability, reliable quality, regular delivery of Colombian green coffee, and on
occasion price guarantees have assisted sales, as has consumer acceptance
of its taste characteristics. APC could adopt strategies such as those below.
• Since their coffee is of outstanding flavour and quality, sales should be
directed to roasters who buy direct from origin (or through a suitable
agent) and who retail single origin coffee either in their shops or
through other retail outlets. It should be noted that sales of roasted
coffee by producing countries direct to foreign retail outlets are
generally expensive and difficult.
• APC coffee is of satisfactory quality, and is suitable for drinking
unblended and can be marketed in the premium or gourmet market,
therefore sales should be directed to roasters who buy direct from
origin or agents. The company should try to ensure that the label
always carry their brand name for identification. Unfortunately, very few
roasters are actually willing to do this. In any case, a roaster who
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markets such a coffee will need to be assured of consistent quality and
regular delivery.
Consumer awareness of the origins they drink does lead to product loyalty
and the development of a brand image. This results in some protection from
the vagaries of the market. If roasters are unable to obtain regular supplies
from one exporter, they will of course be encouraged to seek alternative
sources.
The term 'specialty coffee' originated in the United States. It was initially used
to describe the range of coffee products sold in dedicated coffee shops, in
order to differentiate these coffees from coffee generally available through
supermarkets and other retail outlets. The term 'gourmet' is also but is now
applied to so many products that it has lost all relevance.
Specialty today refers both to whole bean sales and to coffee beverages sold
in coffee bars and cafes (as opposed to restaurants and other catering
establishments). The range includes higher quality coffees, both single origin
and blends, unconventional coffees such as flavoured coffees and coffees
with an unusual background or story behind them. However, with the rapid
growth in the number of specialty coffee retail outlets and more particularly the
expansion of the specialty coffee product range into more mainstream outlets
such as supermarkets, the term has become much looser. It is fair to say that
'specialty coffee' has become a generic label covering a range of different
coffees, which either command a premium price over other coffees or are
perceived by consumers as being different from the widely available
mainstream brands of coffee. The term has become so broad that there is
not universally accepted definition of what constitutes 'specialty coffee,' and it
frequently means different things to different people.
Given this lack of precision in definition it is extremely difficult to describe the
market in a global way. The best approach appears to be to look at the
specialty market from different country or regional viewpoints. However, the
very notion 'gourmet' or 'specialty' suggests some degree of exclusivity. It is
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unlikely that one could market thousands of tons of a particular coffee and still
call it 'exclusive.'
The first lesson to be learned therefore is that one should not 'overdo it.' It is,
and always has been a mistake to consider specialty coffee a different
industry from the rest of the coffee business. Supply and demand will not only
determine the general level of coffee prices, but will also determine the
premium paid for 'quality.'
The second lesson is that producers need to target any special coffee very
carefully because the term 'specialty' covers a large and growing number of
different products, each of which has its own niche.
Premiums for specialty coffee can be considerable at the retail level but the
premiums available for producers are inevitably much lower, although they
can still be significant. It is sobering to realize that mainstream qualities,
including robusta, account for an estimated 85% - 90% of world coffee
consumption, while the share of exemplary and high quality coffee is no more
than 10% or perhaps 15% of the world market. This suggests that for many
producers it would be inadvisable to ignore the mainstream market altogether.
Instead they should concentrate on both: specialty for their top quality and
mainstream for the remainder of their production.
A further point to note is that sales to small roasters are mostly on extended
credit terms, something only an importer can easily afford. Inventory costs,
late payment costs and even the risk of payment defaults are therefore part of
the cost equation. Also, most roasters purchase subject to approval of the
quality on delivery which means the importer will be left with any coffee that
does not meet the roaster's expectations. In other words, the premium for




A niche combines a set of conditions that enable a single species or a single
product to thrive within the greater ecological or commercial environment.
While much of global coffee production consists of mainstream type coffee,
there are many other coffees, often of limited availability, with greatly varying
taste characteristics that appeal to different groups of consumers and which
sell at a premium over mainstream coffees. Simply put, where the producers
or exporters of such a coffee and such a group of consumers get together, a
niche market is created.
Two main factors determine whether a coffee can find a niche market:
quality and availability. 'Availability' is easily understood, but 'quality' is a
subjective term which means different things to different people.
• High quality or premium brands, good cupping coffees, well presented,
but not necessarily visually perfect. Retailed both as straight origins and
as blends. Includes quality, well prepared organic coffees, and washed
as well as superior quality natural robustas. The market for this quality
band is much broader and includes a good percentage of today's
specialty coffee. Also produced by leading multinational coffee
companies and marketed through normal retail outlets such as
supermarkets.
• Mainstream quality, average quality, reasonably well presented but
certainly not visually perfect. Will offer a decent, clean but not
necessarily impressive cup.
In today's specialty market all three types of coffee are represented:
exemplary and high quality coffees either as stand-alone or as a named blend
component and mainstream quality in many of the ready-to-drink and
flavoured drinks that are sold alongside filter coffee and espresso.
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Obviously, for smaller exporters of top quality coffee the exemplary segment
initially offers more promise. However, producers or exporters of good quality
coffee have three basic options open to them.
• Sell to the leading roasters (through the usual trade channels), if volume
sales are required and the coffee sold lacks the flavour characteristics
necessary to be marketed on its own;
• Sell to the specialty roasters either direct or through importers or agents.
The latter in most cases is the more realistic option as these importers or
agents have a wide coverage of the small roasters and other retail outlet
which are too small to import direct;
• Focus on specialty coffee retailers either by selling direct (for roasting in
store) through specialty wholesalers or by selling through specialty
roasters. The number of specialty coffee retailers importing direct is
extremely small, however.
(iv) Reducing dependence on middlemen.
Among the various methods to increase the overall share of value added, one
of the simplest and most frequently discussed is the reduction of
intermediation - depending less on the middleman. While this has obvious
appeal, inexperienced farmers or farmer groups should consider it with
caution. Middlemen, although often derived, have been shown to perform
valuable and sometimes very cost-effective functions by providing credit,
agglomerating volume, finding buyers and providing transport - all with
considerably more efficiency and tolerance for risk than many farmers. Many
producer organizations often do not have the skills, capital or dedicated
personnel to take on the market oriented roles of middlemen. Although
training individuals in such organizations may be helpful in terms of achieving
market transparency it is often a difficult and lengthy process for them to
become effective at other market intermediation roles. An alternative could be
to combine the resources of more than one organization into a second-tier or
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apex group that can then hire the person(s) with the appropriate skills,
dedication and time available to conduct those functions as a formal business.
(v) Capturing product-oriented value by marketing processed or
transformed coffee
For example, soluble or roast and grind, require considerable expertise and
investment, particularly if the target market is overseas. Process-oriented
value (Organic or Eco-certification) can be less costly and in the long run has
the distinct advantage of providing a higher percentage of benefits and
income directly to the producer. This is because, whether a coffee is roasted
domestically or overseas rarely affects the price the producer receives.
Another producer-oriented way of capturing value is to exploit Geographic
Indications of Origin (GIO) or appellations that distinctly connect quality/value
to a particular and specific origin. Often large companies and multinational
are involved in the transformation and distribution of processed coffee and
products and appropriate alliances could be one way to go. Some companies
in Central America are entering the markets for processed coffee products,
such as for example Costa Rica's Cafe Britt. Colombia's launch of its soluble
coffee and soft drink type of products can also serve as useful example of the
process and investments necessary for the successful launch of processed
coffee products.
V (a) Soluble coffee
The soluble coffee market is dominated by two multinational firms: Nestle and
Kraft Foods. One or the other or both have a presence in every main
consumer market and indeed probably in many producing country markets as
well. In addition, there is often a third large supplier in each main market. For
example, in the United States Procter & Gamble enjoys a reasonably large
share of the market while the Ueshima Coffee Company (UCC) is of some
significance in Japan. The larger companies manufacture soluble coffee in
their own plants and rarely obtain soluble coffee from outside suppliers.
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Nestle also operates a small number of soluble processing plants in producing
countries, primarily aimed at supplying the domestic market there, but also
nearby regional markets.
The scope for outside manufacturers lies in supplying product for: -
• Secondary (own label) brands that have no manufacturing facilities
(although this market tends to be rather sluggish) and
• Specialist packers of own label coffee consuming countries.
Most supermarket chains prefer to buy from a specialist packer rather than
direct from origin and usually insist that bulk supplies are repacked in retail
jars. For all practical purposes, an origin supplier seeking to enter the own
label market would be best advised to trade through a specialist packer in a
consuming country, especially as in most cases the finished retail product is a
blend of coffee from several sources.
There are several specialist packers of soluble coffee for own label product in
consuming countries. Some operate their own processing plants, but also
often purchase soluble coffee for blending from other sources to fulfil
contracts that are beyond capacity or when imported soluble is cheaper than
their own product. Other specialist packers have no processing capacity of
their own and merely blend and repack product from other sources.
The retail market for soluble coffee has three general segments: -
• Premium brands of freeze-dried soluble.
Nestle and Kraft Foods dominate in this segment but there is some
significant participation by other brands, particularly supermarkets' own
labels. 80th Brazil and Colombia supply freeze-dried soluble coffee to this
market which is still growing. Although not the most popular form of
soluble coffee, in general freeze-dried coffee is gaining market share in
every consuming country at the expense of other types of soluble coffee.
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It has obtained just under 40% of the soluble coffee market in Japan and
the United States, a little over 30% in Spain and the United Kingdom and
around 20% in Australia. Extra premium blends of freeze-dried coffee
composed solely or mainly of arabica and sometimes from a single origin
are also marketed in this sector.
• Standard brands of spray-dried soluble.
These generally consist of coffee that has been agglomerated.
Agglomeration is a process that not only improves solubility but also
transforms the coffee powder into more attractive granules. Agglomerated
coffee is the most popular form of soluble coffee. It accounts for more
than half the sales in the majority of consuming markets, although it is
losing market share to freeze-dried.
• Cheap blends of spray-dried powder.
This is often soluble coffee that has been imported from origin and
repacked. Considerable excess manufacturing capacity has resulted in
extreme price competition and although is by far the cheapest type of
soluble coffee available in many markets, it is losing market share to all
other types of instant coffee. It does, however constitute the larger share
of the market in Russian Federation and many other Eastern European
and Asian markets as well as in producing country markets.
The total market for soluble coffee has been relatively flat over the past
decade. Estimated consumption in countries that do not produce coffee was
just over 20 million bags GBE, of which 17% was manufactured in producing
countries.
The bulk of the soluble coffee exported from producing countries is spray-
dried powder. Brazil accounts for just under half of all soluble coffee exports.
Intense price competition coupled with diminishing demand has led to a
marked reduction in the spray-dried powder manufacturing capacity in many
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consuming countries, although a significant proportion of that reduced
capacity has been transferred to other, usually emerging, markets. It does not
appear, therefore, that there is a very secure future for new entrants planning
to supply spray-dried powder.
Freeze-dried soluble continues to make significant progress, although
processing is comparatively expensive and the product quality demands a
high proportion of the more expensive arabica. The process is therefore
unsuitable for countries that produce only robusta. The market has primarily
been developed by Nestle and Kraft Foods, although a number of other
companies are actively involved in the sector, particularly those producing
own labels. Brazil and Colombia are important suppliers and while the market
for freeze-dried coffees is growing there are concerns that there is already
quite some manufacturing overcapacity in both Brazil and a number of
consuming countries such as Germany. Freeze-dried coffee accounts for
around 30% of all sales of soluble coffee. Trade opinion suggests that the
market for soluble coffee as a whole is likely to grow only slowly over the next
ten years; by contrast the market for freeze-dried coffee is expected to
continue growing at a much faster rate.
The opportunity for new suppliers must be weighed against current excess
manufacturing capacity, which is probably sufficient to cover most, if not all,
the anticipated increase in demand for a number of years. Although most
exports of soluble coffee are as finished product (in primary, not retail,
packaging) some sales are made as frozen concentrate fro finishing in the
country of destination. Most of the coffee exported was produced in the
country of shipment.
Trade sources suggest that the cost of manufacturing plants for soluble coffee
is considerable, ranging from around US$ 10 million for an annual capacity of
around 1,800 tons of spray-dried or 600 tons of freeze-dried coffee, to around
US$ 20 million for an annual capacity of 8,500 tons of spray-dried or 1,500
tons of freeze-dried coffee. By far the greatest proportion in the investment
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would be taken in foreign exchange. Without an assured year-round
production programme, operating costs would be excessive.
V (b) Decaffeinated coffee
The decaffeination process is applicable to both soluble coffee (spray-dried
and freeze-dried) and roasted coffee. Decaffeinated coffee enjoyed a
considerable rise in popularity during the 1980's, especially in the United
States, but its performance has not been very strong. Decaffeinated coffee is
seen as having to compete with other specialty coffees and although
consumers of decaffeinated coffee tend to. be very loyal to the product,
caffeine no longer appears to be an issue that most consumers are
particularly concerned about. Despite technological improvements in the
decaffeination process over the last fifteen years and in particular the
development of what many see as better processes which use water and
carbon dioxide rather than methyl chloride, the product is losing market share.
It is estimated that decaffeinated coffee currently accounts for around 10% of
all coffee sales. Usually, it commands only a small premium over non-
decaffeinated coffee and frequently is sold for the same price: consequently
the economics of the decaffeination are tight. In early 2002, trade sources
estimated that the cost of the process ranged from US$ 0.50 - 0.60 per kg of
green bean, for the cheapest process using methyl chloride, to about double
that for the more expensive methods. Incidentally, there is a substantial
market for extracted crude caffeine in industries such as pharmaceuticals and
soft drinks.
v (c) Roasted coffee
The market for roasted coffee is somewhat less concentrated than that for
soluble coffee. Although market concentration in the roast and ground sector
increased significantly, particularly during the 1980's and in the late 1990s, the
development of the specialty sector has slowed the trend and the number of
small roasters operating worldwide did increase significantly for a while.
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Small roasters rarely buy direct from origin, but make their purchases through
importers who are able to offer some security of supply and cost savings for
small lots. In many cases importing direct from origin involves buying a full
container load of around 300 bags (18 tons) which is simply too large an order
for most small roasters.
As a result of the development of the specialty and gourmet sectors in many
countries single origin roasted coffee are now widely available. However,
blends of roasted coffee from different origins remain the most predominant
roasted coffee product in the overall market today and this makes it difficult for
producers to enter the retail market on their own. The trade in roasted coffee
from origin is limited: in 2000 only 11,800 bags were exported from origin in
roasted form compared to 4.3 million bags GBE of soluble and 84.4 million
bags of green coffee. In total, roasted coffee accounted for just 0.13% of all
coffee exports.
There are several obstacles to exporting roasted coffee from origin. None of
them are insurmountable but together they form a significant barrier to this
trade. Roasted coffee rapidly loses its flavour unless it is vacuum packed or
gas flushed. A supplier wishing to export must therefore install an appropriate
packing facility.
Furthermore, consumers are becoming increasingly sophisticated and
demand high quality packaging that requires a significant level of investment.
Additionally, legislation in importing countries frequently insists that packs are
marked with a 'sell by' or 'use by' date. Transporting the product to market
from origin can take a considerable amount of time and this puts the exporter
at a disadvantage compared to a more local roaster who is able to offer the
retailer a product with a longer shelf life. Exporters of roasted coffee therefore
need to develop speedy distribution systems in order to minimize this
disadvantage. This usually requires the active collaboration of agents or
specialized importers or roasters in the target market (s).
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V (d) Ready-to- drink and extracts or concentrates
Canned, ready-to-drink (RTD) coffee was originally developed by the Ueshima
Coffee Company. By 2001, it accounted for 17% of total consumption in
Japan, where it is sold mainly through vending machines and accounts for
more than a third of all soft drink sales. RTD coffee in plastic bottles, cartons
and other packs is becoming increasingly popular and is generally sold in
supermarkets. Canned coffee products are also finding a good market in
many emerging markets in Asia, particularly in China, although the success of
the product depends very much on its availability in vending machines. RTD
coffee products are particularly suitable for iced coffee drinks, and as such are
beginning to make inroads in the North America and Western European
markets. Originally the obvious requirement for success was access to
vending machines and vending sites and as a result soft drink manufacturers
currently dominate this sector of the market. But the major roasters are now
pushing hard as well, not least because market sources consider the
prospects for RTD coffee excellent because of its convenience. Sales of
shelf-stable (i.e. not refrigerated or frozen) iced coffee products are the most
likely area of growth because such products can be sold off supermarkets
shelves like any other dry goods. Another potential winner could be
concentrated liquid coffee. The frozen concentrate is designed for
commercial and out-of-home consumers such as hotels, restaurants and
offices for whom, it is reported it will produce a 'fresh' cup of coffee in a few
seconds.
How much these developments do for coffee consumption or indeed coffee
quality is debatable - the coffee content is usually not very high and the
coffee taste is often masked by flavouring. Nevertheless, it is a new and
growing niche market. Brazil and Colombia are the main manufacturers of
concentrate at origin. Unfortunately, it is difficult to see how smaller producers
without a substantial home market to support a manufacturing capability can
participate.
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5.2.3 Downstream Value Creation
Downstream processing is often seen as a way of adding value to a raw
product at origin. Unfortunately this is not as straightforward as it at first
appearance: if it were, there would be a far greater trade in processed coffee
products from origin than there is today. In 2000/2001 just 5.4% of all coffee
exports from producing countries were processed coffee. This is slightly
higher than 10 years ago but virtually identical to the proportion achieved 20
years ago. Producer exports of processed coffee have not exceeded 6.5% of
world exports in any year since 1980, and the bulk of this is instant coffee.
Roasted coffee exports have never exceeded 0.2% of total coffee exports
from producing countries.
The consuming market for coffee is dominated by a few very large companies,
mainly multinationals, which sell there product by promoting their brand name
and image through large-scale advertising. Normally advertising expenditure
is equivalent to between 3% and 6% of sales revenue. Most coffee is sold
through supermarket chains, which in general, stock a relatively limited range
of brands that meet their criteria for sales per unit of shelf space. In that
environment it is difficult and costly for new brands and new suppliers to
penetrate the market but it is not impossible as there are always some
openings for new suppliers.
Smaller packers and roasters however have managed to secure a place in
practically every consuming country to a greater or lesser degree, often either
selling coffee under their own brand names or providing supermarket chains
with own label (also known as private label) coffee to be sold under the brand
name of the supermarket. Own label or secondary brands generally sell at a
substantial discount and are not usually advertised in the press or television.
Instead they are promoted in store.
In the past such brands were usually considered to be inferior in quality but
that is not the case any more and as a result own label coffees have been
able to capture a significant share of the market. The own label area offers
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the best opportunity for coffees processed at origin because such coffees
cannot afford large advertising expenditure. But with increasing concentration
at the retail level the scope for new entrants is becoming more limited and
furthermore the own label market is fiercely price competitive. Soluble coffee
packed for supermarkets retails at a discount of 10% - 30% (in some cases
even more) on the price of the leading comparable brands. For spray-dried
soluble coffee the retail market is not only oversupplied but is also shrinking
as consumers switch to better quality freeze-dried and agglomerated soluble
coffees.
5.3 GROWING ORGANIC COFFEE
Organic coffee is grown as part of an intensive, holistic agricultural production
management system that includes the composting of organic materials,
mulching, shade regulation and biological pest control. Such a system is
based on the principle that a value corresponding to that harvested should be
returned to the soil. It excludes the use of agro-chemicals. For the product to
be marketed as organic, it must be certified as such by a third party. Western
countries have developed extensive legislation for organic products.
The conditions that must be met before coffee may be marketed as organic
are both comprehensive and well defined. No coffee may be brought to the
marketplace and labelled organic unless it is proved to conform to the
regulations. In other words, coffee can be marketed as organic only when it is
certified as such by a recognized organization or certifier, based on regular
inspection of all stages of production, processing, transporting and roasting of
the coffee.
Many consumers are increasingly concerned with the content of their daily
intake of food and beverages: organic foods are perceived as healthier. This
motive is less important for coffee than it is for some other crops in that
roasted coffee hardly ever contains harmful residues.
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Although the quality of organic coffee is not necessarily better than that of
conventional coffees, the market for organic coffee is increasingly demanding
higher quality, which is why organic coffees are often positioned in the
specialty segment.
In principle producers are motivated by the same concerns, but in addition
they want to secure their social and cultural future by realizing the premium
that certified organic coffee obtains. This benefit depends on the demand for
organic coffee, which in turn determines the amount of the premium that can
be obtained and the extra costs involved in organic production.
Growing any organic product, including organic coffee, is more than just
leaving out fertilizers and other agro-chemicals. Coffee produced in this way
should instead be called 'natural' coffee and, to the surprise of many, the
industry looks upon this as non-sustainable production. This is because, in
the long run, the soil will be depleted by natural production, which is often
referred to also as 'passive cultivation' or 'organic by default.'
To achieve sustainable production it is necessary to make active use of
various organic agriculture techniques including the composting of organic
material, mulching of the soil under the trees with organic material, use of
biological pest control, and investing in shade regulation. The principle of
sustainable agriculture is that a value corresponding to that harvested should
be returned to the soil. All possible methods have to be used to enhance the
fertility of the soil. This is why passive production of coffee, even when no
chemicals are used, is viewed as non-sustainable and not as organic
Not only coffee cultivation, but all subsequent steps in the production chain
have to be certified. On-farm processing, storage, transport, export
processing, shipping, export, import, roasting, packaging, distribution and
retailing all have to be certified organic. Contact with conventionally produced
coffee must be excluded and so there has to be a separation in space and/or
time. Spraying or fumigation with toxic agents is never permitted and special
measures must be taken to prevent contact with areas where fumigation has
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taken place. Adequate records are to be kept of incoming and outgoing
coffee so that the entire product flow can be documented and accounted for,
often referred to as traceability. All the steps in the chain should therefore be
documented and administered in a way that makes it possible to trace back
the origin of the product from one step to the next (track and trace), ensuring
that no contamination with conventional coffee has occurred. This traceability
minimizes the risk of fraud at all stages and is a very important part of the
inspection process by certifying organizations.
5.4 BRAND RECOGNITION
This is a valuable asset in an increasingly competitive coffee market. Brands
are essentially a symbolic embodiment of reputation. Indeed some countries
have taken great pains to be perceived as a brand. Colombia is the perfect
example and its logo and trademarks are widely recognized. Colombia's
achievement was not a simple one. It has involved 50 years of coordination
at the level of field quality, national policy, and consistent promotion. It has
further involved a long-term commitment to multimillion dollar promotion
budgets. But programs do not need to be so grandiose in order to be
successful. Several smaller Central American brands have already achieved
a measure of market recognition and success.
There are some clear rules and lessons of brand development. They require
long-term investment and a strong commitment from all of the stakeholders
involved in developing them. For producers that feature coffees with
Geographic Indications of Origin, this means a coordinated quality
commitment throughout the appellation that is necessarily born of a strong
organizational structure. That structure is vital in order to provide adequate
information and technical training to the farmers in that circumscribed area
and to monitor compliance with the quality requirements of the appellation or
brand. Government needs to support the mapping and development of
adequate geographic indicators and must also enforce the regulations
protecting them.
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Appellation-based brands initially require considerably more work to develop
than a label or logo drawn up by a marketing agency. For example,
appellations require terrain analysis, stakeholder negotiations, legal definitions
and regulations all of which take patience, resources, and commitment.
However, in the long run, they may also be more beneficial to the local
farmers who share upon and like fashions, can come and go. Appellations on
the other hand are the property of local owners who can therefore capture
much of the value themselves in this feature, perhaps more than any other,
may make them more sustainable
5.5 PROMOTION OF COFFEE
The promotion of coffee consumption world wide is vital. Competition from
other beverages is intense and the total amount of money spent on
advertising soft drinks, for example, far exceeds the amount spent on coffee.
Well coordinated national and international generic (general) campaigns are
necessary not only to encourage people, particularly in emerging markets, to
take up coffee drinking, but also to retain the loyalty of existing consumers.
This is not to ignore the fact that roasters worldwide invest tens of millions of
dollars in brand promotion, the costs of which are estimated to be between
3% and 6% of total sales. Although such promotion is not generic, it does
encourage consumption of coffee in general. Nevertheless, there is a distinct
need for the entire industry to engage in generic promotion of the type as
undertaken by the ICO, most recently in the Russian Federation and China.
(NYBT 2002)
5.5.1 Generic versus brand (or type) promotion
There are several methods of categorizing promotional activities depending
upon the ultimate objective. Promotion conducted with respect to a basic
product such as coffee for the purpose of enlarging the total market for the
product is termed generic promotion. For example the ICO campaigns in
China and the Russian Federation did not focus on anyone brand or indeed
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type of coffee but promoted all types and brands of coffee simultaneously.
This helps the entire industry rather than just one segment or company.
Brand promotion on the other hand is conducted with the objective of gaining
a greater market share for a particular brand of coffee, rather than enlarging
the market for every brand. Even if the promotion results in an overall
increase in the market as a whole it still represents brand rather than generic
promotion, as this was not the original intention. When individual producing
countries use promotion to encourage demand for their own coffee, this
cannot be considered generic either as it is merely attempting to influence
decisions within the existing market about the composition of supply rather
than attempting to enlarge the market for all producers.
Necessity for generic promotion
As first glance, it may seem that generic promotion of coffee is unnecessary.
The widespread consumption of coffee suggests that demand for the product
is practically guaranteed. But there is a real need to educate potential
consumers on emerging markets. Demand for coffee can decline.
There is now a very real danger that as the initial enthusiasm for specialty
wears off, and with the growing corporatisation of the specialty sector, the
generic content of any promotion will diminish quite rapidly. Ther~ is therefore
a need to replace this with an ongoing generic campaign in order to ensure
that any gains are not only held on to but also built upon.
In most countries coffee faces immense competitive pressures from the strong
and ingenious generic promotional efforts of such beverages as tea and milk
as well as from the many well-financed campaigns promoting various brands
of soft drink and juice. These industries would like to convince coffee drinkers
to switch to their products. Coffee drinkers need reassurance that coffee is
the right drink for them. In addition, new potential consumers need very basic
information about coffee to allay any fears they might have about coffee and
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to learn the best ways of preparing the beverage. This is best achieved
through generic promotion.
Who are the customers
It is helpful in developing a generic promotion campaign to understand the
primary characteristics of the people who drink coffee as well as to discover
what benefits they derive from coffee consumption. With this information,
promotional messages are more likely to be relevant and believable.
One purpose of generic promotion is to keep existing customers satisfied and
perhaps to encourage them to consume more coffee. The other purpose of
generic promotion is to encourage people who do not drink coffee to try the
product and also to create a positive attitude towards coffee in order to
improve the chances of their liking their first tastes of the beverage.
People have different reasons for choosing to drink or not to drink coffee. It
may therefore be necessary to divide the total potential market into broad
segments, called target markets, each requiring a different promotional
message or even a differentiated product or distribution
channel.(www.ncausa.org)
Given limited promotional resources and the changing levels of competition,
marketing efforts must be judiciously targeted and professionally developed.
The most efficient approaches focus on relationships such as roaster visits
and trade shows, rather than on untargeted advertising. Some useful
promotional strategies such as E-Trade and business development, internal
consumption campaigns, and Market Information Systmes (MIS), are already
being tested and utilized in the coffee trade.
5.5.2 E-trade, auctions and the "Cup of Excellence" competition
Internet-based coffee auctions have been tested for two years with some
notable success, albeit on a very limited scale. In the most notable B2B trade
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to date a Norwegian firm paid $11.00Ilb for a small lot of Las Nubes green
beans (winner Cup of Excellence, Guatemala 2001) and the 2002 Nicaraguan
auction brought an even higher price for one of its coffees. Brazil's e-auction
of 54 tons of its better coffees fetched prices as high as $2.60/lb last year.
Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama and Uganda have been
early leaders in this field that is about to get bigger. Businesses like Comdaq
are providing solution platforms for developing coffee e-commerce.
Experience with the "Cup of Excellence" program is the most extensive and it
is one template available to producing countries that want to encourage
quality improvements and quality recognition for their coffee producers.
The cup of excellence is recognized internationally as a coffee cupping event
that is designed to identify and promote the best coffees (within a given
country) through a series of blind cupping conducted by national and
international judges. The judges evaluate every detail of the coffee from
aroma, acidity, to body and balance. Such competitions are a testimony that
emphasis on coffee quality through improved farm practices combined with
the installation of model cupping laboratories can lead to significant
behavioural changes. Competitions like the Cup of Excellence can improve
the image of a country in international markets. Three cup of excellence
competitions have been conducted so far in Brazil, Guatemala (2001) and
Nicaragua (2002) with more countries negotiating to do so in the future. It
worth noting that the tonnages involved in this promotional activity are very
low to achieve the basic strategy of increasing revenues for the producers
today.
The internet can be used for more than just traditional marketing. The ability
to share new forms of information can expand the possibilities to include
support systems for land use monitoring, certification and Geographic
Indications of Origin (GIOs) or Appellation. One pilot program funded by
USAID/Peru is successfully testing this denomination of origin/marketing
partner project.
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5.5.3 Market Information System
Information is the lifeblood of efficient agricultural markets. The availability of
accurate price and other market information helps reduce risks and
transaction costs and better enables market participants to plan and
coordinate their production and trading activities. Market information is a
public good and offers valid arguments for it to be ump-started with public
funds. However, around the world, many efforts to develop public sector
Market Information Systems (MIS) have failed. Most MIS's have lacked
commercial utility and have been unsustainable (Giovannucci, 1999).
A good example of a sophisticated MIS is an evolving project that is
developing information on "green" markets and is operated by Centro de
Inteligencia Sobre Mercados Sostenibles (CIMS). It is based in San Jose,
Costa Rica under the aegis of INCAE, one of Latin America's leading
academic institutions. All Central American countries can use this system and
even a more modest coffee-oriented system could also be effective.
Organizations like ZCGA and trade associations can be excellent conduits of
specialized market information, particularly if they are trained to manage and
disseminate it. Indeed, this is a significant service they can provide their
constituents, but one that has proven difficult to manage and sustain without
efficient organizations. Valuable market information is also passed through
market alliances and is another reason to support integrated supply chain
development.
5.5.4 Increasing domestic promotion and consumption
One of the opportunities that emerge from a low price global market is the
development of domestic markets. With adequate stimulus, the results can be
very worthwhile. A prime example is Brazil. It struggled for years with modest
per capita consumption rates. In the early 1990s some of the lower quality
coffee that was commonly sold throughout the country began to be replaced
with smoother and more flavourful coffee. Until then, much of the available
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domestic coffee was sold primarily on a price basis and often included triage,
coffee hulls and assorted non-coffee fillers. This change in product quality
was accompanied by a series of promotional campaigns directed at various
segments of society, including the young. Domestic consumption responded
dramatically. Now Brazil has increased its per capita consumption and has
increased its domestic markets so successfully that is second only to the
United States among the world's major consumers of coffee. Brazil's per
capita coffee consumption is at 4.6kg, compared to 2.3kg for Colombia and
2.1 kg for Central America as an average (but nothing that per capita coffee
consumption in Costa Rica is as high as 3.7kg). In Zambia local consumption
hardly exceed 200 tonnes per annum. Coffee is regarded as a luxury among
the general poor population of the country.
Moreover, among the many direct and indirect participants in the coffee
industry increased internal consumption of better quality coffee can improve
familiarity with the characteristics of good coffee. This can arguably help
contribute to improvements in production quality. This explains why coffee
quality will remain a specialty business in Zambia.
The good news is that consumption can certainly be improved and there is
some evidence that better quality is associated with higher consumption rates.
Unfortunately modest attempts to pursue this model in Colombia have not
proven to be very successful. This could be due to Colombia's already
relatively high quality of domestic consumption and that the modest attempts
were made during a period of economic recession and during a period of high
global prices when much of the focus was on moving good coffee out of the
country.
5.5.5 Producer oriented promotion
Improved market prices and market access are not the most important basis
for deciding to adopt improved or differentiated production methods. Indeed,
it is vital that promotional policies focus on the local benefits rather than the
price premium or market benefits which may be evanescent. Organic, Fair
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Trade and eco-friendly coffee can offer considerable environmental, social
and even health benefits to growers and their communities. These include:
(a) shade trees, use of organic fertilizers and composing to help preserve the
soil structure, thereby preventing erosion and protecting watersheds;
(b) organic husbandry supports biodiversity especially in microbial life that
provides natural control of pests and pathogens;
(c) organic methods improve nutrient recycling and enhance soil
quality/fertility and
(d) soil management and localized input methods provide very useful risk
management especially for poor rural small holders.
5.6 HEDGING
Hedging offers definite advantages to commodity producers and costs
comparatively little. Hedging with futures allows a producer to lock in a price
that reflects the producer's business goals (a profit). The producer should
therefore determine the actual price available in the futures market that will
support the cost of production plus a profit. If prices fall, the producer still
achieves something near the originally intended pricing goals. If prices rise,
the producer foregoes a larger profit margin.
The loss of this potential (speculative) extra profit is balanced by the
protection afforded against dramatic and damaging declines in the market.
There are also other advantages in addition to this price-insurance aspect of
hedging.
First, hedging offers a flexible pricing mechanism. Anyone who feels they
have made the wrong decision on the exchange can have an alternative order
executed easily and immediately. Second, hedging operations involve only
small initial outlays of money. If the price of futures goes up, the producer
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who has sold futures may be asked to pay additional margins; but the price of
their physicals will also have risen. Third, because a futures contract provides
considerable price protection, banks and other financial institutions are more
likely to finance producers, exporters and traders who hedge their crops and
positions than those who do not.
Finally, commodity trade banks and risk solution providers put together
different risk mitigation instruments that are tailored to a client's requirements.
For example, a put option can be graduated to extend over the usual
marketing season by spreading equal portions over two or three futures
trading positions, at different strike prices if so wished. Each individual portion
can then be exercised individually. Alternatively, a solution provider may
simply guarantee a minimum price. For payment of a premium, they
undertake to make good any shortfall between the insured price (the minimum
price the producer wishes to secure) and the price ruling for the stated futures
trading positions (New York or London), either at a producer buys a 'floor:' a
guaranteed price minus the cost of the premium.
5.6.1 Managing price risk and volatility
Of all coffee producing countries only Brazil has been able to establish a
successful internal futures market for coffee, the Brazilian Mercantile and
Futures Exchange. Growers in all other producing countries must look
abroad, directly, if they wish to make use of futures markets. In many
countries small growers and smallholders are mostly locked out of risk
management markets anyway, for reasons that include a lack of knowledge,
high costs and inappropriate contract sizes. (Note though that the L1FFE
futures exchange robusta contract size is just 5 tons and new NYBOT mini
arabica contract is 12,500 Ib, or 5.7 tons.)
Just as for gaining access to credit, potential solutions include the aggregation
of production and financial capacity through the establishment of cooperatives
or other forms of producer groupings. Such groups can then decide how they
approach price risk management: simply as an insurance that they purchase
98
or as part of the marketing process. (It should not be ignored here that in a
number of countries the performance record of cooperatives has been less
than impressive.)
Coffee farmers face at least two distinct sets of problems associated with
prices; the outright price level and volatility. Historically, coffee prices have
been among the most volatile of all commodity prices. Price volatility was
particularly pronounced during the 1990s and is expected to continue,
together with the downward tendency in coffee prices. Volatility is the result of
an inelastic demand curve and supply shocks, mainly caused by past
production disruptions in Brazil (mainly because of frosts), production
adjustments in response to price increases and policy changes (such as the
suspension of the economic clauses of the International Coffee Agreement).
Cyclical price volatility, particularly within the crop season, can be managed
through price risk management instruments. However, the secular price trend
requires other longer-term elements, such as diversification or improvements
in quality and productivity.
Speculative behaviour also needs to be addressed. This was one of the
sources of the banking problem. In the past, many farmers chose not to fix
coffee prices, even after their crop was exported; rather, they retained
speculative futures-linked positions with exporters (GTC arrangements). The
lack of coverage in a period of decreasing prices led to the reduction in their
ability to repay their loans.
Tools to manage price volatility already exist. However, small and medium-
size agricultural producers in developing countries are, in general, unable to
access them. Impediments to their use by producers include inappropriate
instruments to suit their needs, high transaction costs, and little understanding
of their use. Additionally, in the developed world, many producers frequently
do not access risk management instruments directly, instead they access
them indirectly through processors and traders. Some options to manage
lower and volatile prices are described below.
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Ways in which coffee producers can get access to risk management markets
are the focus of studies underway in El Salvador and Nicaragua. Two key
issues are to develop competent aggregators of risk management instruments
and to examine ways in which risk management instrument can help improve
access to credit. Local aggregators for demand for risk management
instruments could be producer organizations, cooperatives, rural credit
institutions and traders. Preliminary results indicate that it is critical to
strengthen the capacity of producer organizations and cooperatives to deal
with price risks and improve their marketing of coffee. Approaches being
explored are:
(a) Linking price insurance to a loan agreement
A farmer who borrows with price insurance should be a better credit risk that
one who borrows without it. From the perspective of the lender; a portfolio of
debt that is insured should strengthen the lending institution. It should also
improve the flow of credit for farmers who agree to buy price insurance. This
arrangement may be useful to countries seeking to improve the flow of credit
to coffee (and other agricultural) sectors.
(b) Adopting sales management techniques
Like hedging strategies, cooperatives that manage sales on behalf of their
members can use these techniques. These techniques could have a double'
benefit. They enable a cooperative to pay a higher initial proportion of the
market value of the coffee to a producer. They also protect the ability of the
cooperative to make payments in the future. Both APC and ZCGA need to
adopt a hedging strategy, well defined for each season
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(c) Using inventory management.
Cooperatives and other producer organizations may not wish to sell all their
coffee immediately after harvest. This way, they can spread their sales more
evenly throughout the crop year and take advantage of price rises later on.
This provides a level of flexibility in selling. Price risk management could
allow producers to protect the value of their inventories from unexpected price
declines during the crop year. Holding costs and pressure to repay crop
facility loans would prohibit this strategy for APC.
(d) Aggregating quantities for hedging
Farmers with a relatively small quantity of a commodity can enter into
purchase contracts using this method. Processors, traders and cooperatives
can play a useful role in this regard. Tools like this have arisen in developed
countries, along with sophisticated purchasing contracts that have risk
management tools embedded in them. Entries able to provide this type of
purchasing arrangement rarely exist in the developing world. The potential for
developing them needs to be discussed.
(e) Using guarantee contracts.
There are arrangements in place between farmer organizations and users that
provide price protection to these farmers; Fair Trade is one of them. Fair
Trade guarantees a price to farmers that is not only higher (around $1.20 to
$1.30 per Ib; when prices are $0.50 to $0.60 per Ib) but also fixed. This is
another effective way to provide price protection to coffee producers.
5.6.2 Buying put options
This is the right to sell futures at a stated price at some point in the future, and
is much simpler than hedging. The cost that needs to be financed is known
up front and no margin calls need to be faced. The premium will depend on
circumstances, but can at times be very substantial. Even so, it may be
101
easier to raise finance for this than for straight hedging. As always, the
provider will still need to be reassured about how the cost of the option will
eventually be recouped.
5.6.3 Tailored solutions
Risk solution providers tailor risk instruments to client's requirements. For
example, options can be graduated to extend over the usual marketing
season by spreading equal portions over two or three futures trading
positions, if so wished, at different strike prices. Each individual portion can
then be exercised individually.
Alternatively the solution provider may simply guarantee a minimum price.
Against payment of a premium, they undertake to make good any shortfall
between the insured price (the minimum price the growers wish to secure)
and the price ruling for the stated trading positions in New York or London,
either at a given date or based on the average price orver a number of days.
The producer has bought a 'floor': the guaranteed price less the cost of the
premium. (Consumers would buy a 'cap' to protect themselves against future
price rises.)
5.6.4 Swap agreements.
Producers can also 'swap' price risk by giving up the benefits from future price
rises in exchange for a guaranteed minimum price. Swap agreements could
also cover more than one year, with tonnages and settlement dates set for
each quarter. The concept is nothing new and has been extensively used to
limit exposure to currency and interest rate fluctuations. Innumerable variables
are possible, making it impossible to provide a standard model.
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5.7 Price risk management as part of marketing
5.7.1 Forward sales of physical coffee at a fixed price
This is the most straightforward form of price risk management as part of
marketing. The size of the expected crop is reasonably well known, prices are
satisfactory and buyers have enough confidence in the seller to commit to
them on a forward basis. This is perhaps the ideal situation but it is seldom
encountered nowadays. And when prices are very low, fixed price forward
contracts look attractive only to the buyer.
5.7.2 Selling physicals forward PTBF buyer's call
PTBF - Price To Be Fixed
This means growers lose all control over the fixation level and therefore the
price unless they simultaneously also sell a corresponding amount of futures.
But this would expose them to margin calls and potential liquidity problems,
assuming they could even find the funds to finance the initial deposits.
5.7.3 Selling physicals forward PTBF seller's call
This might appear to be the answer but is not necessarily so either. Unless
the seller fixes immediately, all such deals establish is a contractual obligation
to deliver and accept physical coffee.
The PTBF sales sets the differential the buyer will pay in relation to the
underlying futures position(s), but the general price risk and the decision when
to fix remain entirely open. In other words, the PTBF sale does not mean the
seller has made a price decision - that will only be the case once they fix.
Many sellers are unable to bring themselves to fix at unattractive levels, and in
falling markets a good number even roll fixations from one futures position to
the next, preferring to pay the cost (usually the difference in price between the
two positions) to gain more time in the hope that prices will eventually rise.
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This does not happen only when prices are generally low. In a falling market
it is sometimes very difficult for sellers to accept that today they must fix at
less than they could have done yesterday or the day before. To avoid such
fixation traps one should set internal 'stops' so that fixing takes place
automatically when a certain price (up or down) is reached. Such orders to fix
can be given to whoever is responsible for the actual execution, basis GTC or
'good till cancelled.'
When fixed price sales are not feasible the simple alternative is to sell PTBF
and to fix immediately, thereby fixing both the base price and the differential
which, together, make up the final sales price. If there are concerns about
'fixing too early' or 'what if the market goes up,' then one also buys a call
option accepting that the cost of this of course comes out of the sales price for
the physicals.
5.7.4 Alternative solutions
In many countries growers can and do sell basis PTBF to local exporters and
so they do not necessarily need to have direct access to the overseas market
for this type of operation. But if to access price insurance they must sell
locally then their bargaining position may be weakened. And in countries with
indirect marketing systems, such as central auctions, the grower has no direct
access to the exporter in any case so this option is not available.
Together with the international banking system, institutions such as the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International
Coffee Organisation, the World Bank and the Common Fund for Commodities
(CFC) are actively and imaginatively seeking new credit and risk insurance
solutions for small growers, through pilot projects in a number of countries.
The ever-lower coffee prices have in recent years starkly demonstrated the
need for such initiatives, but the unprecedented scope of those price falls has
also made it more difficult to mobilize the resources and motivate the active
grower participation necessary for these initiatives to be launched.
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5.7.5 Collateral management
Using United States experience and systems as a basis, pilot projects in
Uganda and Tanzania have been financed by CFC and implemented by the
United Nations Office for Projects Services (UNOPS). They are setting some
of the stage through the drafting and introduction of specific national
legislation dealing with all aspects of collateral management for the coffee
industry, including addressing the vexed question of how lenders can
legitimately and efficiently turn collateral into true collectables. This is a step
in a lengthy process that must also include providing the necessary expertise
to being prepared in both Uganda and Tanzania. A further CFC financed
project, dealing specifically with price risk management for smaller growers,
commenced work in March 2002 to compliment the collateral management
initiative with which it will be linked in due course.
5.7.6 Price risk management summary
The International Task Force on Commodity Risk Management in Developing
Countries (ITF) was first converted in January 1999. It comprises major
international institutions, producers' and consumers' groups, major commodity
exchanges, commodity trading firms, academia and private sector entities. Its
work is carried out by the Commodity Risk Management Group of the World
Bank. The ITF aims to provide smallholder producers in developing countries
with access to the same risk-management instruments available to producers
in industrialized countries. This involves identifying rural institutions to serve
as local transmission mechanisms for such insurance. The ITF provides
technical assistance, training and 'honest broker' services to local institutions
(e.g. cooperatives, domestic banks, or traders) in the use of price risk
management instruments and serves as an honest broker for the delivery of
these instruments to smallholder producers.
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
"There is no simple solution, there is no silver bullet. There is a consensus
that an integrated package which includes improvement in coffee quality,
increase in consumption in non-traditional markets, strengthening of the
bargaining and marketing powers of producing countries and support to
diversification should be implemented," said Kelvin Cleaver, Director of the
Agriculture and Rural Department (ARD) of the World Bank.
Innovative solutions such as facilitation of access to price risk management
products to groups of small farmers in several Latin American and African
countries and new marketing strategies for quality improvement and increase
of consumption were also showcased.
Coffee prices reached their lowest levels in 30 years last year (and in 100
years in real terms) and have risen only slightly with the ICO composite
indicator price at 52.89 US cents/lb on 16 May 2003. In almost all coffee
producing countries, such prices are unable to cover production costs and
have led to serious social and economic problems, including increased
poverty, indebtedness and abandonment of coffee farms.
The World Bank and the International Coffee Organisation (ICO) have been
working together to analyze the problems arising from the present coffee crisis
in line with the preoccupations of governments and civil society groups.
"We will need to decide whether there is still a role for supply management to
address the crisis. In the light of the universal acknowledgement of an
imbalance in the market, we will also need to pursue the promotion of
consumption through various means, including the improvement of quality,
and reduce dependence through diversification," said Nestor Osorio, ICO
Executive Director. "We will need to establish the capacity of international
agencies and the private sector to work on concrete actions in areas like
private sector management, and what measures can be taken to bring
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producers once again into the profit-zone. The ICO is ready to coordinate the
successful implementation of these ideas."
It has been noted that at debt levels of 40% the company has the lowest cost
of capital and also that the financial distress risk was least therefore it can be
concluded that there is an optimum financial structure for each industry. For
the coffee industry 40% debt can be concluded to be the ideal capital
structure.
The impact of commodity price has been reflected in the profitability of APC
year after year (table 3), with continued losses the capital structure was
further weakened creating further financial distress risk. It can be concluded
that business risk can trigger financial risk. Firms operating with net loss carry
forwards like APCare often in financial distress, and since equity values
typically decline in such circumstances, financial distress itself causes
leverage ratios to increase. Therefore net operating losses caused by
commodity prices are a proxy for low tax benefits of debt and also financial
distress.
It is also very important to look at price risk management tools, however if
prices remain low for a period of years, commodity price risk management
instruments will have limited use. These instruments are better suited for
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African Plantations Company Ltd
Coffee Production & Exports Table 1 (a)
Crop Year Production Exported Average Price Average
(MT) (MT) US$/MT APC
1984
1985 397 377 2,678
1986 618 598 3,761
1987 515 499 2,256
1988 450 432 2,813
1989 261 245 1,939
1990 1,313 1,294 1,550
1991 1,329 1,309 1,857
1992 1,792 1,772 1,495
1993 1,530 1,514 1,527
1994 1,582 1,536 1,973
1995 1,231 1,195 3,856
1996 1,580 1,544 2,485 1,764
1997 2,167 1,884 2,574 4,652
1998 2,628 2,285 3,529 3,241
1999 3,450 3,358 2,810 2,271
2000 2,200 2,180 2,041 1,896
2001 5,868 5,832 1,542 1,168
2002 5,000 4,531 1,250 1,213



































1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Proi Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast
14 9 8 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
. · - 5,401 5,401 5,401 5,401 5,401 5,401 5,401
4,195 6,276 9,744 10,220 11,359 7,014 7,014 7,014 7,014 7,014 7,014 7,014
2,601 3,272 4,906 5,357 5,236 5,134 5,134 5,134 5,134 5,134 5,134 5,134
(1,401) (2,791) (4,431) (8,647) (11,121) (11,254) (11,616) (11,050) (9,721) (7,434) (3,969) 637
5,409 6,766 10,227 6,935 5,478 6,300 5,938 6,504 7,833 10,120 13,584 18,190
· · 1,500 2,500 1,442 1,094 720 360 0 0 0
- · 3,000 3,000 3,380 3,380 3,380 3,380 3,380 0 0
- · · 0 250 946 946 946 0 0 0
· · 750 1,250 750 250 0 0 0
5,409 6,766 10,227 11,435 10,978 12,122 12,608 12,300 12,769 13500 13,584 18190
3,290 5,118 7,525 6,591 7,421 7,038 6,732 6,432 6,132 5,832 5,532 5,232
501 918 2,278 3,524 4,048 4,251 4,442 4,681 4,681 4,681 4,681 4,681
3,791 6,036 9,803 10,115 11,469 11,289 11,174 11,113 10,813 10513 10,213 9,913
176 158 176 314 977 1,036 1,036 1,036 1,036 554 554 554
513 368 408 1,221 1,104 2,558 280 280 280 280 280 280
218 272 241 406 393 600 600 600 326 326 326 326
144 231 208 1,006 10 4 822 830 1,774 3,287 3,574 8,383
1,154 362 213 (750) (1,639) · 0 0 0 0 0 0
·
2,205 1,391 1,246 2,197 846 4,198 2,738 2,746 3,416 4,447 4,734 9,543
519 658 822 870 1,326 1,104 1,104 1,460 1,460 1,460 1,362 1,265
- · · . 261 200 100 . - . ·. - · . 2,000 . . . . - ·
68 3 7 11 · . - - . . ·
587 661 822 877 1,337 3,365 1,304 1,560 1,460 1,460 1,362 1,265
1,618 730 424 1,320 (4911 833 1434 1,186 1,956 2,987 3,372 8,278






IFC Loan (Libor + 4.5%)
SDFC Loan (8%)
SEL loan (11%)
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PROFIT AND lOSS ACCOUNT
Currency Usd' 000
Table 3
IPARTICULARS 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2,004 2,005 2,006 2,007 2,008
Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Pro] Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast
Turnover: Coffee 806 839 512 573 1,769 1,482 6,428 5,400 6,210 7,142 8,213 9,445
Cost of Sales (535) (371) (759) (1,168) (3,159) (1,590) (5,692) (3,895) (3,895) (3,895) (3,895) (3,895)
Goss ProfIU(loss) Total . 271 468 (247) (595) (1,390) (108) 736 1,505 2,315 3,246 4,318 5,550
Admln Overheads (765) (931) (553) (571) (735) (567) (391) (380) (380) (380) (380) (380)
Redundancy costs . (261)
Debt forgiveness . 1,245
Operatlna profit/loss - (494 (463 (800 (1,166 (2,125 309 345 1,125 1,935 2,866 3,937 5,169
Interest - IFC (72) (182) (76) (85) (55) (28) 0 0 0
Interest - SDFC . (213) (254) (265) (250) (122) 0 0 0
Interest - SCB - (78) (87) (261) (140) (140) - · -
Interest - SEL (169) (96)
Interest other f55' (14 (1 (201
Total Interest (55) /14 (1) (72) (473) (606) /70n 1446) (290) 0 0 0
Net Profit before Tax & Exchanoe losses (549) (477 (801) /1,238) /2,598) (297) /362 679 1,645 2,866 3,937 5,169
Exchange loss (1,992) (1,403) (7,246) 0 0
Taxation (3) 0 0 0 (114) (316) (579) (473) (563)
Net Profit after Tax . f552 12,469) /2,204) /8,484 (2,598) (297) /362 566 1,329 2,287 3,464 4,606
Stock Movement Coffee:(kgs)
Opening. Stock 30 19 665 420 1,641 - - - · .
Total Production 130 227 250 248 949 1,285 2,385 2,743 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
Sales 124
1
227 220 261 303 1,530 1,164 4,384 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000 3,000
Closing Stock I 30 19 665 420 1,641 . - . - - -
Selling Price· Average I kg
I I
U16 1.16 1.27 1.47 1.80 207 2.38 2.74 3.151.77 4.66 3.2 1.89
Cost of sales I kg
I I I
1.4 2.92 3.72 2.06 1.37 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30
Interest cost/kg 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.31 0.52 0.16 0.15 0.10 . · .
Total cost/kg 5.98 5.03 5.98 2.85 2.60 1.55 1.57 1.52 1,43 1,43 1,43
Exchange rate· average
I
1,098 I 1,356 I 1,709 2,400 3,910 I 4,210 4,233 I 4,600 5,290 6,084 6,996 8,045 9,252
DeDreciation 2481 365/ 405 I 511 503 503 503 503 503 503







IParticulars I 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2,004 2005 2,006 2007 2,008Actual I Actual Actual Actual Proj Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast Forecast
Opening Cash Balance 231 208 1,006 10 4 822 830 1,774 3,287 3,574
Turnover 512 1,768 1,784 457 4,796 5,400 6,210 7,142 8,213 9,445
Debtors 7 2 25 927 1,666 -
External Loan - 4,500 1,000 750 500 (500) (500) (250)
TOTAL I 519 I 6,270 2,809 2,134 6,962 4,900 5,710 6,892 8,213 9,445
Operational Payments
Operating costs (860) (1,455) (3,670) (3,334) (3,961 ) (3,772) (3,773) (3,773) (3,773) (3,773)
Interest payments - (71 ) (258) (168) (372) (446) (290) 0 0 0
Total I (860)1 (1,526) (3,928) (3,502) (4,333) (4,218) (4,062) (3,773) (3,773) (3,773)
Non Operational
Capital Expenditure (3,182) (2,158) (1,711) (324) (306) (300) (300) (300) (300) (300)
Taxation - - - - - (473) (563)
Redundancy - (61 ) (100) (100)
Lease repayments (30) (193) (63) (9) - - - - -
IFC Loan repayment - (348) (374) (360) (360) - -
SDFC Loan repayment - - - - - - (3,380) -
Standard Chartered Bank 010 2,000 (2,000)
Nedbank 010 1,927 (2,013) - -
Holding Company 3,500 (1,758) 100 1,112 50 100 56
SEL medium term - 650 863 - - (946\ - -
Total I 3181 (3,946) 122 1,362 (1,811) (674) (704) (1,606) (4,153) (863)
--
TOTAL Cash required I (542)1 (5,472) (3,806) (2,140) (6,144) (4,892) (4,766) (5,379) -{7,926\ (4,636\
Net Cash For Period I (23)1 798 (996) (6) 818 8 944 1,513 287 4,809
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Year




African Plantations Company Lld
Financial Structure
Year WACC DIE Rallc Price
1997 13% 0% 211
1998 13% 0% 147
1999 13% 0% 103
2000 9% 39% 86
2001 11% 50% 53
2002 12% 48% 55
2003 12% 53% 65
2004 10% 47% 80
2005 10% 39% -
2006 10% 25% -
2007 13% 0% -
2008 13% 0% -
Debt Equity Ratio
Fig 2.0
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